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THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT USE OF TRADEMARKS:
AN OLD/NEW PROPOSAL
David S. Welkowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an old problem in trademark law. Someone develops a
trademark and starts using it on goods or services. Business
improves and the company slowly expands into different areas
of the country. Sooner or later this first user discovers that
someone else in another part of the country is using the same
mark on the same goods. Although the second user started
using the mark after the first user, the second use was made
without knowledge of the first user. The next thing you know,
there is a lawsuit. In such a case, who should win?
Each side has an argument. The first (or "senior") user was,
after all, the original user, which usually gives it priority in a
given area.1 It did nothing wrong, and now that its business
has expanded, the senior user simply wants to use the same
trademark throughout its marketing area. If the senior user
has to change its mark, it will lose the goodwill built up in the
mark, or fragment its business into two different names. The
second (or 'junior) user also has arguments of fairness. It did
not know about the senior user, nor did it have reason to know,
and it has built up a local reputation using the mark. Forcing
the junior user to change names would cause a forfeiture of its
fairly earned goodwill.
What, then, is the result? Since at least 1916, the most prob-
able outcome is that the junior user will be permitted to contin-
* Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. A.B., 1975, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D., 1978, New York University. I would like to thank my colleague, David
Treiman, for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916) ("In the
ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark in the same market, it is
correct to say that prior appropriation settles the question."). Id.
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ue to use the mark, exclusive of the senior user, in the area in
which it had been using the mark prior to the lawsuit.2 Courts
have been sympathetic to the fairness argument of the geo-
graphically remote junior user. However superficially equitable
this result may appear, such concurrent use of the trademark
(the senior user is still free to use the mark wherever else it
had been using it 3) is fraught with problems. What happens in
areas where neither user has yet penetrated the market? What
happens when the two users' areas of market penetration be-
come close enough that consumers on the fringes become con-
fused? What happens if one or both advertises in media that
reach the other's territory? How do we define the respective,
exclusive territories of the senior and junior users? While some
of these questions have general answers in the case law, the
state of the law is unsatisfactory at best. Current law is a
combination of common law doctrine and federal statutory law.
Federal law applies in cases involving a trademark registered
under the federal trademark statute. For trademarks not regis-
tered under the federal statue, common law applies.4
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it discusses the
current unsatisfactory state of the law. Parts II-V examine the
history of this problem, how it has evolved, the statutory re-
sponse contained in current federal trademark law, and the
difficulties with the current law. Second, part VI of this article
proposes a new mechanism for dealing with these issues. The
proposal attempts to leave only one user of a mark in most
cases, while accounting for the fairness arguments that can be
made by both sides.
II. COMMON LAW BEGINNINGS AND THE tTEA ROSE"-RECTANUS
DOCTRINE
Before there was comprehensive federal trademark regula-
tion, trademark doctrine was entirely a matter of common and
state statutory law.5 The two most influential common law de-
2. Id. at 403.
3. See, e.g., Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. Technically, federal law, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, also applies in many
suits involving unregistered marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1993). But in those cases
there is little difference from common law. See infra part IV.E.
5. The first federal trademark statute was passed in 1870. However, the
316 [Vol. 28:315
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cisions discussing the territorial reach of trademark protection
were handed down by the United States Supreme Court in
1916 and 1918.'
The first of these decisions, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Met-
calf,7 involved a trademark for "Tea Rose" flour.8 The plaintiff
in that case, Allen & Wheeler,9 claimed to have begun using-
the name "Tea Rose" on flour in 1872 and, by the time of the
suit, had used it in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Massachusetts.'
Defendant, Hanover Star Milling, began using the same name
on flour in 1893, though not in any of the same states as Allen
& Wheeler, and was using the name in several southern states
by 1904, without knowledge of the prior use by the plaintiff."
The sales areas of the litigants did not overlap and the concur-
rent use was coincidental. Eventually, Allen & Wheeler learned
of defendant's use and filed suit to enjoin it. 2 Allen & Wheel-
er obtained a nationwide injunction against defendant's use of
the "Tea Rose" mark from a federal district court in Illinois,
which the defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 8
Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82 (1879), on the ground that it exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power. A very
limited statute was enacted in 1881. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:03, at 5-8 (3d ed. 1992). A somewhat more com-
prehensive, though still limited, statute was enacted in 1905. Id. Not until passage of
the Lanham Act in 1946 (named for its principal sponsor, Rep. Fritz Lanham), was
there a truly comprehensive federal trademark statute.
6. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
7. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
8. Id. at 406.
9. Hanover Star Milling actually was a consolidation of two cases: Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 204 F. 211 (5th Cir. 1913), and Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513 (7th Cir. 1913). The latter is the pertinent case for
our purposes.
10. Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 407, 409.
11. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. at 514. The Supreme Court's opinion simply
notes that Hanover's use of the "Tea Rose" mark began "shortly after its incorpora-
tion in the year 1885." 240 U.S. at 410; see also id. at 421 (indicating use at least as
early as 1893, and perhaps as early as 1886).
12. These decisions predated Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and
thus were predicated on "general" common law principles. Although not binding on
states after Erie, these decisions were very influential in the development of state
common law.
13. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 514, 523 (7th
Cir. 1913) (the summary of the case notes that it is an appeal from a preliminary
injunction), affd, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); see also 240 U.S. at 408. The district court
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On appeal plaintiff maintained that, as the first user of the
"Tea Rose" mark, it was entitled to nationwide protection. 4
The appellate court, however, disagreed. Distinguishing various
cases in which other courts appeared to endorse the concept of
unlimited territorial protection,15 its opinion stated that the
protection only existed as far as the user's trade actually ex-
tended. 6 Under the appellate court's rationale, if the first user
sells goods in a particular territory, a second user may not
thereafter enter the territory. But in "virgin territory," another
user may come in and build up a trade in the same mark. 7
The court added two caveats, however. First, the junior user's
use must be "in good faith." Second, the junior user should not
be allowed to attempt to deliberately forestall the senior user's
expansion by establishing trade in a new area. 8 Finding nei-
ther to be extant in the case at hand, the court reversed the in-
junction. 9  The case reached the Supreme Court, which
affirmed." Like the Seventh Circuit, the Court brushed aside
plaintiffs assertion that first in time is first in right where
trademark rights are concerned.2' Instead, the Court held that
a remote geographic junior user of the mark, who had no prior
knowledge of the other user, could continue to use the mark in
its territory.
opinion is not reported. A search of the record reveals that it simply granted the
motion for a preliminary injunction without giving any specific reasons. Record on
Certiorari at 52-53, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 v.s. 403 (1916).
14. 208 F. at 515, 517.
15. Id. at 518-19, 521 (citing Thomas G. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Bald-
win, Inc., 171 F. 125 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909), affd 183 F. 22 (2d Cir. 1910); Hygeia Dis-
tilled Water Co. v. Consolidated Ice Co., 144 F. 139 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1906), affd, 151 F.
10 (3d Cir. 1907); Levy v. Waitt, 61 F. 1008 (1st Cir. 1894); Cohen v. Nagle, 76 N.E.
276 (Mass. 1906)).
16. 208 F. at 516-17.
17. Id. at 522.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 523.
20. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
21. Interestingly, the Court stated at the outset that there was no applicable
state statute or common law rule and therefore the case was decided on "general"
principles of common law. Id. at 411. Where those general principles came from is a
bit of a mystery, since no citation of authority was given. In our post-Erie time the
Court would, of necessity, decide which state's law applies and what its rule, accord-
ing to that state's highest court, most probably would be. That would have been a
messy task given the many possible applicable state laws and the paucity of analo-
gous case law.
22. In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark in the
318 [Vol. 28:315
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Meanwhile, another case, United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co.,' was wending its way to the Supreme Court.'
This case involved a dispute over the use of the mark "Rex' on
patent medicines.' Plaintiff began using the mark in 1877,
primarily in New England.26 Defendant began using the mark
in 1883, without knowledge of plaintiffs prior use, in Louisville,
Kentucky.7 This case differed from the "Tea Rose" case be-
cause this suit was precipitated by the national senior user's
(plaintiffs) entry into the previously geographically remote
market of the junior user. Thus, by the time of the suit, the
parties' areas of trade overlapped.
The district judge in Rectanus understood that the remote
user situation was one where equities existed on both sides. He
wrote:
In our broadly extended country the separate and indepen-
dent use of these two trade-marks ran along contemporane-
ously in widely separated localities, without either of the
parties most interested knowing what the other was doing,
until a comparatively few months before this action was
brought. The judgment in this case, we think, must neces-
sarily work a hardship upon one or the other of the parties,
and possibly upon both. But, notwithstanding that probable
result, we are clearly of opinion that the facts stated re-
quire us, under the express mandate of the authorities
presently to be cited, to hold that the right of the plaintiff
to the exclusive use of the word 'Rex' in connection with
same market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation settles the
question. But where two parties independently are employing the same
mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly re-
mote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legal-
ly insignificant; unless at least it appear that the second adopter has se-
lected the mark vith some design inimical to the interests of the first
user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to fore-
stall the extension of his trade, or the like.
Id. at 415.
23. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
24. The case was noted in the Hanover Star Milling opinion. 240 U.S. at 420
("The recent case of Rectanus .. .is closely analogous.).
25. Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 94-95.
26. Id. at 94.
27. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 206 F. 570, 571 (W.D. Ky. 1913),
rev'd, 226 F. 545 (6th Cir. 1915), affd, 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
1994] 319
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medicinal preparations for dyspepsia and kindred diseases
of the stomach and digestive organs must be sustainedY
Thus, the district court entered an injunction in favor of the
plaintiff, the first user in the United States.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, but it did so on what it viewed as
a narrow basis. Essentially, the Sixth Circuit found that the
plaintiff had abandoned the mark in Kentucky, or at least the
city of Louisville, by failing to expand with the (imputed) know-
ledge that someone might hit upon the same name for a similar
product.2 ' The court was careful to note more than once that it
was deciding only the case before it and was not attempting to
create a general rule. ° It acknowledged the fact that each side
had a certain amount of equity and noted: "Only in an extreme
case would a court reach the conclusion which we here
reached.""' Although ultimately agreeing that the defendant,
who used the mark without knowing of plaintiffs prior use,
should prevail, it served notice that other remote users might
not be so fortunate. For example, the court stated that
plaintiffs failure to expand "might not be important, if it had
characterized [plaintiffs] conduct for one or two years, or some
other short period, or if it could be said that they were merely
awaiting a natural development." 2 The problem was that
plaintiff operated for twenty years without expanding into or
near Kentucky.33 Evidently, had plaintiff expanded to Ken-
tucky within a "short" time, the fact that defendant adopted the
28. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., 226 F. at 550.
30. Id. at 549, 550, 551, 554.
31. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). The court added:
The trade-mark owner, prosecuting and exploiting his business in the
ordinary way, can have nothing to fear from the rule of the opinion. Not
only will the cases, where this situation arises, be rare, but only in a
fraction of those cases will there be practical difficulty in determining the
conflicting rights of the general owner and the one who must be left in
the possession of what he has taken. Such difficulties as may develop we
must think to be a lesser evil than it would be to permit plaintiff, by
asserting a prior right, to destroy that which had been built up in the
reasonable belief, induced by plaintiffs conduct, that no such prior right
existed.
Id.
32. Id. at 550.
33. Id.
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mark in good faith in a remote location may not have made a
difference. The court's distinction was temporal, not just geo-
graphic. Its balancing of the equities accounted for the fact
that, as this case demonstrated, expansion does not always fol-
low a "natural," contiguous geographic path.3"
Thus, we are left with a picture of a court aware of the diffi-
culty of the issue, but ultimately deciding that, where the ju-
nior user has made extensive use in good faith for a significant
period of time, the court will not enjoin the use. On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment, ruling
that the defendant, as an innocent remote user, was entitled to
continue using the mark in Louisville. 5 However, the Supreme
Court did not exhibit the same sensitivity to the equities on
both sides. Instead, relying on its Hanover Star Milling deci-
sion, the Court issued a broad opinion affirming the remote ju-
nior user's right to use the mark. 6
The Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus cases established a
doctrine that remains the basis of common law trademark to-
day: 7 an innocent, geographically remote junior user can ac-
quire trademark rights within the junior user's established
territory equal to or superior to a more senior user of the
mark.38
In retrospect, the two cases seem to reach an obviously cor-
rect result. After all, the junior user, in good faith, had built up
a business around the trademark. It is striking that the Su-
preme Court in Hanover Star Milling cited no authority for its
conclusion, and in Rectanus merely cited its Hanover Star Mill-
34. Perhaps this is simply another version of the doctrine called "zone of natural
expansion," which allows the senior user an area of protection in addition to its area
of actual use. See infra part IIIA. However, the clear temporal, rather than geo-
graphic, discussion is an additional feature. It would make the "zone of natural ex-
pansion" into both a geographic and temporal zone.
35. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1918).
36. Id. at 101, 103.
37. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.01[2], at 26-3 to 26-4.
38. An important caveat to the doctrine is that the junior user must not have
known about the prior use by the senior user. Otherwise, the junior user's rights will
be lost. See James M. Treece, Security for Federally Registered Mark Owners Against
Subsequent Users, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008, 1020-22 (1971); Comment, The Scope
of Territorial Protection of Trademarks, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 794-95 (1970) [herein-
after Comment].
1994]
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ing decision. This suggests that the Court either believed it was
breaking new ground or viewed the proposition it propounded
as so obvious as to need no authority. But the Tea Rose-
Rectanus framework is by no means preordained; after all, the
district courts in both Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus ruled
in favor of the senior users."9 Indeed, the district court in
Rectanus was as parsimonious in its citation of authority as the
Supreme Court was in coming to the opposite conclusion.4"
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's caution in the Rectanus case illus-
trates the tension between apparent equity to the junior user
39. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 206 F. 570 (W.D. Ky. 1913). The
district court's decision in Hanover Star Milling can be deduced by inference, as the
appeals court reversed the district court. 208 F. 513 (7th Cir. 1913). See supra note
13.
In fact, precedent on both sides was cited in the appellate court decision in
Hanover Star Milling. 208 F. at 518-22. For example, in Levy v. Waitt, 61 F. 1008
(1st Cir. 1894), the parties each used the mark "Blackstone" on cigars, but in differ-
ent areas of the country. The court stated:
It may be that, according to the letter of this citation, the selection of
the name 'Blackstone,' with a single sale, would have been sufficient to
confirm in Levy Bros. the exclusive right to its use; and this indepen-
dently of all questions which might arise from the fact that A. P. Holley
& Son, Waitt & Bond, and Levy Bros. were practically occupying differ-
ent markets. But this is not the law.. The right to a trade-mark at com-
mon law must not be confused, as it too frequently is, with the prima
facie right existing under registration statutes. It arises to such a limited
extent from the mere matter of selection or discovery of the name or
symbol used that this may be of trivial consequence.
Id. at 1011. Similarly, in Thomas G. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Baldwin, Inc.,
171 F. 125 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909), affd, 183 F. 22 (2d Cir. 1910), the trial court refused
to grant an injunction to the alleged national senior user of the mark "Baltimore
Club" for whiskey. Plaintiff used the mark in the Baltimore area and defendant used
it in New York City. Id. at 127. The court cited "the rule that a limited use in a
small area does not give a party trade-mark rights as against other interests in other
sections of the country, where no deception would be likely to result." Id. at 129.
Applying that principle to the case at hand, though noting that here it was the
smaller user attempting to enjoin the larger, the court refused an injunction. Id.
Alternately, in Hygeia Distilled Water Co. v. Consolidated Ice Co., 144 F. 139
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1906), affd, 151 F. 10 (3d Cir. 1907), the trial court granted an injunc-
tion against a defendant-junior user of the mark "Hygeia" although the defendant
operated for over a decade without knowledge of plaintiffs business and in an area
into which plaintiffs product had not been sold. 144 F. at 140. The district court spe-
cifically stated that "the fact that [plaintiff-senior user] has not up to this time ex-
tended its trade to the locality occupied by the [defendant]" would not prevent an
injunction. Id. at 142.
40. 206 F. at 572. Interestingly, the Court in Hanover Star Milling stated that
there were no cases on point and that Rectanus was "closely analogous." Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916).
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and the practical inequities in terms of business planning that
it imposes upon the senior user.
Both the existence of prior precedent and the tension be-
tween the two sides of the issue can be found in a strikingly
similar case that preceded Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus.
The case, Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manheim,4" was decided by
the Supreme Court of Washington in 1910. The plaintiff was a
California company that established a store called "Eastern
Outfitting Company" in Seattle, Washington in 1902.42 Three
years later, in 1905, defendant started a business called "East-
ern Outfitting Company" in Spokane, Washington. There was
no indication in the case that the defendant knew of plaintiffs
business, or that customers in Spokane were confused between
the two stores. In 1909, the plaintiff entered the Spokane mar-
ket, precipitating the lawsuit.' Plaintiff claimed that, as the
first user in Washington, it was entitled to statewide priority in
the use of the Eastern Outfitting name. The Supreme Court of
Washington rejected that claim in an opinion that mirrors
much of the argument later made in Hanover Star Milling. The
court distinguished between a "general" business and a "local"
business, indicating that only a "general" business could claim
wider geographic protection." The court then recited the apho-
risms that "[plaintiffs] protection is coextensive with his mar-
ket" and "there cannot be unfair trade competition unless there
is competition."4'
Finally, this court noted, as would the Supreme Court in
Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus, that the defendant was the
first to use the name in Spokane and that there was no actual
confusion until the plaintiff entered the market." Thus, the
court rejected plaintiffs claim of a statewide priority.47
41. 110 P. 23 (Wash. 1910).
42. The company complied with all legal requirements for a foreign corporation
doing business in Washington. Id. at 24.
43. Id. There is some indication in the case that, when it entered the Spokane
market, plaintiff knew of defendant's use of the "Eastern Outfitting Company" name.
The trial court found that plaintiff entered the Spokane market "With the intention to
cheat and defraud the [defendant] and the public [in Spokane] . . . by taking
[defendant's] trade name." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Sartor v. Schaden, 101 N.W. 511 (Iowa 1904)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25. In fact, it appears that the lover court enjoined plaintiff from oper-
1994] 323
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Thus far, the arguments largely parallel those later used by
the United States Supreme Court. But there were two dissents
filed in the Washington case. One dissent stated that, having
qualified to do business in the state, plaintiffs rights in its
name extended throughout the state.48 The second dissent, w-
ritten by Justice Chadwick, added a more telling commentary:
[it seems to me that the reasoning of the majority defeats
itself. It proceeds upon the theory that a business once
established must cover a whole field in its inception, rather
than upon the evident fact proven by the history of the
whole business world; that a business legitimately organized
is entitled to the protection of the law in its development
from a small local concern to the larger concern into which
it has the natural right to grow.4"
Justice Chadwick's dissent thus recognized the countervailing
argument in favor of the senior user-business expansion takes
place gradually and is hindered if the mark cannot accompany
the expanding business. His statement is similar to the warn-
ing issued by the Sixth Circuit in Rectanus, that the facts there
presented a case of abandonment of the potential market,
meaning that the large time lag between the establishment of
plaintiffs business in Massachusetts and its entry into the
Louisville market was legally significant. In Manheim, the time
lag was seven years, not more than twenty years. If the majori-
ty in Manheim and the later Supreme Court decisions establish
one theme, the desire to protect good faith remote users, Jus-
tice Chadwick's dissent sounds a second theme: the need to
allow orderly and reasonable business expansion. This latter
theme seemed swept aside by the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ating in Spokane, because plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to overturn a contempt cita-
tion against a third party. Id. It is also interesting to note that the court distin-
guished this type of case from a "trade-mark" case, referring to plaintiffs name as
merely a "trade-name". Id. This suggests that a claim of a technical trademark might
have succeeded if plaintiff had a "trademark" under contemporary law. For a discus-
sion of the difference between trademarks and tradenames, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 6, § 4.03[2].
48. 110 P. at 25 (Morris, J., dissenting). This is analogous to the theory Justice
Holmes later would espouse in a concurring opinion in Hanover Star Milling. See
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 436 (1916) (Holmes, J., concur-
ring).
49. 110 P. at 25 (Chadwick, J., dissenting).
324 [Vol. 28:315
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ments at the end of that decade. But it did not disappear, as
we shall see.
In addition to the themes of protecting good faith remote
users and protecting expanding businesses, there is an issue in
the concurrent user problem that is not often discussed but
which was present in both the Hanover Star Milling and Recta-
nus cases. In Hanover Star Milling, the Seventh Circuit pre-
sented it as an alternative ground for decision. The issue is
extraterritoriality.
In Hanover Star Milling, after deciding that a geographically
remote junior user may concurrently use a trademark of a se-
nior user, the Seventh Circuit offered "[alnother route ... to
the same destination."" The court noted that if the senior user
of "Tea Rose" is entitled to enjoin the junior user, it must be
because the law of an appropriate jurisdiction grants it a mo-
nopoly on the name Tea Rose. The Seventh Circuit assumed
that, in the absence of a federal statute, the only such law
would be that of Ohio, where the case was brought, "and, if so,
complainant's monopoly created by that law can have no extra-
territorial effect."5 The majority opinion in the Supreme Court
made only indirect mention of the extraterritoriality issue.52
But Justice Holmes, in a concurring opinion, dealt with the
issue directly, stating "that when a trade-mark started in one
state is recognized in another it is by the authority of a new
50. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co. 208 F. 513, 522 (7th Cir.
1913), affd, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
51. Id. at 523. It is not clear why the court did not ask whether the laws of
Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi, where defendant sold its flour, would
permit the injunction. Apparently, because plaintiff was an Ohio corporation, the
court assumed that Ohio law must apply.
52. See 240 U.S. at 416. The Court stated:
To say that a trademark right is not limited in its enjoyment by
territorial bounds, is inconsistent with saying that it extends as far as
the sovereignty in which it has been enjoyed. If the territorial bounds of
sovereignty do not limit, how can they enlarge such a right? And if the
mere adoption and use of a trademark in a limited market shall (without
statute) create an exclusive ownership of the mark throughout the
bounds of the sovereignty, the question at once arises, "What sovereign-
ty?" So far as the proofs disclose, the Allen & Wheeler mark has not
been used at all, is not known at all in a market sense, within the sov-
ereignty of Alabama, or the adjacent States, where the controversy with
the Hanover Star Milling Company arose.
1994] 325
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sovereignty that gives its sanction to the right.""3
The issue also arose in the Supreme Court's consideration of
the Rectanus case. In a passing observation, the Court noted
that no reliance was placed on the law of Massachusetts, under
which plaintiffs mark had been registered, to support the claim
for an injunction in Kentucky. The Court stated: "Manifestly,
the Massachusetts statute ... could have no extraterritorial
effect."' Thus, the Court also recognized, if obliquely, one of
the difficulties of a common law doctrine being extended
nationwide.
The statements concerning extraterritoriality express a sepa-
rate and very powerful reason for defending remote junior us-
ers. The senior user's straightforward claim is that, as first
user, it is entitled to nationwide priority. However, in the ab-
sence of any applicable federal law, no state has the power to
grant a nationwide right to use a trademark. Doing so would
interfere with the sister state's right to control unfair competi-
tion occurring within its boundaries."5 This conflict illustrates
the difficulty in dealing with this issue in the absence of a
federal statute. Because no single state can grant complete
relief, and because of courts' natural tendency to favor the local
senior user over the national senior user, fragmentation in the
use of the mark frequently results. Several users will use the
same mark on the same goods in different areas of the country.
Although this may not have been a major problem in 1916, in
today's highly mobile society with nationwide media advertising,
concurrent usage becomes a far more serious issue for consum-
ers, if not for businesses.
These early cases identify three themes that remain the basis
of today's law. First, a geographically remote junior user of a
mark, who has been using the mark in good faith56 will be
permitted to continue using the mark in its trading area. As a
corollary, however, this "protection follows use" analysis implies
53. 240 U.S. at 425 (Holmes, J., concurring). The majority opinion in this pre-Erie
case relied on "common-law principles of general application." Id. at 411.
54. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918).
55. See generally David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality and the Prob-
lem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1992).
56. This usually means without notice of the prior user.
326 [Vol. 28:315
CONCURRENT USE OF TRADEMARKS
that there may be many such enclaves in which different people
use the same mark on the same or similar goods or services.
Second is the theme sounded in the opinions outside the
Supreme Court: the first user of a mark should have the right
to expand its business. Permitting a remote junior user to con-
tinue using the mark in its trading enclave interferes with such
expansion. To some degree, the federal trademark statute recog-
nizes the importance of this theme.
The third theme is recognizing the limits on the authority of
the states to control this problem. To the extent that this facet
of trademark law develops as a common law doctrine, it will be
beset by a continuing problem. The geographic scope of trade-
mark protection cannot easily be solved by any individual state
when a trademark's use crosses state boundaries.
Although these themes have yielded a fairly substantial body
of case law and statutes, neither the cases nor the statutes
have been able to reconcile many of the inherent difficulties of
the doctrine. We now turn to the development of common law
and statutory law to examine these problems in more detail.
HI. THE CURRENT COMMON LAw DOCTRINE
The current common law doctrine of the various states in
large part follows the structure set out in the "Tea Rose"-Recta-
nus doctrine discussed in the previous section.7 A good faith
geographically remote junior user whose use will not lead to
confusion of the public, will have priority rights to the use of
the mark within its own territory. Subsequent state cases have
built on this structure. 8 Although this has imparted a certain
57. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's decisions came down twenty years
before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 54 (1938). Thus, the Court purported to
announce "general" principles of common law. Now that the common law in this area
is largely state-based, there will be differences in application from state to state.
58. In one respect, the common law moved forward logically. In Rectanus, the
Court raised, but did not decide, the question of the junior user's right to enjoin the
senior user within the junior user's territory. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918). Subsequently, lower federal court and state court deci-
sions have established the right of the junior user to enjoin the senior user from
encroaching on the former's territory. See e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 649 F. Supp.
164, 176 (D. Utah 1986), affd, 904 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
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degree of uniformity to the law, it has not resolved all its diffi-
culties.
A regime that awards rights based upon use in a particular
location naturally raises questions about the precise scope of
the territorial rights granted to any user. The common law
developed certain doctrines to deal with this issue. Because the
touchstone of trademark infringement is whether the public is
likely to be confused by the two marks,59 the territorial scope
of trademark protection may be greater than the actual sales
territory of the user.6° For example, a senior user is entitled to
protection against a subsequent user in a territory where the
senior user's mark is known, even if its goods are not sold in
that area.6' When a mark is known in an area, a second user
would be a source of confusion, even to non-purchasers of the
goods. Take, for example, Coors brand beer before Coors began
selling outside of the western United States. The Coors brand
was known across the United States, even where it was not
sold.62 This area where the mark is known but not used is
commonly called the senior user's "zone of reputation."' Unfor-
tunately-and not unexpectedly-the precise contours of these
areas are often difficult to delineate. Thus, lines of demarcation
are somewhat arbitrary.' Moreover, at the fringes there will
be confusion among consumers with access to both users' prod-
ucts or advertising.65
998 (1990); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co., 206 F.2d 482, 483,
485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (affirming injunction for junior user), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
937 (1954); Weatherford v. Eytchison, 202 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
59. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23.01[1].
60. Generally these doctrines expanding protection beyond area of sales are de-
scribed as protecting the senior user. See, e.g., Miles J. Alexander & James H. Coil,
Geographic Rights in Trademarks and Service Marks, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 104-05
(1978); Note, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075,
1084 (1990) (referring to "the territorial extent of the senior user's rights").
61. See e.g., Koffier Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697,
704 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd mem. 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977); Alexander & Coil,
supra note 60, at 105; Note, supra note 60, at 1085.
62. Cf Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1948) (en-
joining a bar in San Francisco from using a mark similar to that of a well-known
New York restaurant).
63. See, e.g., Note, supra note 60, at 1084-87.
64. For discussions of how such lines are drawn see Natural Footwear Ltd. v.
Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1397-99 (3d Cir. 1985); Sweetarts v. Sunline,
Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1967).
65. Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 266 A.2d 87, 91-92 (Pa. 1970) (re-
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A. Zone of Natural Expansion
In addition to the zone of reputation, many courts will pre-
clude a subsequent user from using a mark in the senior user's
zone of probable or "natural" expansion. Thus, even if the ju-
nior user is the first to use the mark in a particular territory, a
court may find that it was an area into which the senior user
would "probably" or "naturally" be expected to expand. In es-
sence, the "zone of natural expansion" provides room for the
senior user to expand its business, without worrying about
unknown subsequent users.6 6 The concept grows out of a state-
ment in the Hanover Star Milling decision. The Supreme Court
stated that the Hanover Star Milling result might be different
if it were "a case where the junior appropriation of a trademark
is occupying territory that would probably be reached by the
prior user in the natural expansion of his trade."67
The senior user's zone of natural expansion can be difficult to
delineate in practice" and is not universally accepted as a val-
id construct.69 Nevertheless, it is a prominent feature of many
common law situations. The great difficulty of applying this
doctrine is due partly to the fact that it is a fiction. Unless the
owner of the mark in a territory has made definite plans to
expand, it is nothing more than a prediction-a kind of judicial-
ly created "breathing space" or "buffer zone" in which the
mark's protection is deemed to extend, despite a lack of use or
reputation.7" However, very early it became clear that this sort
of prediction is problematic. In Rectanus,7' for example, a Mas-
sachusetts seller leaped over several states to begin selling in
Kentucky. No doubt this expansion must have seemed "urmatu-
fusing to prohibit national user from advertising in concurrent user's trade area), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
66. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1028
(11th Cir. 1989); Note, supra note 61, at 1087-89.
67. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916). This is a re-
spouse to the second theme identified in the previous section-the problem posed by
an expanding business.
68. See-Note, supra note 61, at 1099-1109.
69. See Raxton Corp. v. Anania Assoc., 635 F.2d 924, 931-32 (1st Cir. 1980).
70. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1028
(11th Cir. 1989).
71. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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ral" to the Court in 1918; yet somehow it seemed logical to the
seller.
The zone of natural expansion doctrine assumes that, absent
evidence to the contrary, the "expansion" will occur in areas
geographically contiguous to the user's present trade area.72
The -Rectanus case demonstrates how faulty such a logical
sounding theory may be in practice. Of course, it would be
nearly impossible to set forth a realistic theory of a "natural"
expansion that allows for other than geographically contiguous
expansion. The only types of evidence that could support non-
contiguous yet "natural" expansion would be firm plans to ex-
pand, a showing that the only reasonable existing markets are
in a particular location, or evidence that the industry as a
whole has a history of non-contiguous geographic expansion.73
All but the first type of evidence would be very difficult to
evaluate.
Another difficulty with the zone of natural expansion doctrine
is that courts do not agree which factors are significant in de-
termining this "zone."74 This has at least two related negative
effects. First, it makes client counseling difficult. Second, be-
cause the client cannot know the extent of its rights, it makes
business planning difficult. An expansion into what later turns
out to be another user's zone of natural expansion could prove
to be an expensive mistake.75 And the senior user normally
has the right to expand virtually anywhere, except in areas
72. See Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987)
(citing "dominance of contiguous areas" as a factor in determining the zone). See also
Tally-Ho, 889 F.2d at 1028.
73. However, even if the latter were shown, it probably would be hard to show
that such a pattern mandated protection in a particular location, absent the second
factor.
74. See Note, supra note 60, at 1103-09; id. at 1085 (noting disagreement in the
federal courts of appeals even as to what constitutes a zone of actual penetration).
Professor McCarthy notes the absence of "any firm guidelines" in this process, 2 Mc-
CARTHY, supra, note 5, § 26.09, at 26-35, but sets forth four general factors in his
treatise that have been used by the courts. Id. at 26-35 to 26-36.
75. Expansion by a junior user after it knows of the existence of the senior user
is not per se improper. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Weiner King Corp., 615 F.2d 512,
522 & n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see generally Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 266
A.2d 87, 89-90 (Pa. 1970) (both sides expanded after knowledge of each other), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
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where the junior user has established a market or, perhaps, a
reputation.76
These problems have led to criticism of the doctrine" and
its rejection by some courts.7" The Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition, for example, rejects the broad theory of zone of
natural expansion.7" Moreover, the junior user seems largely to
be left out of this protective analysis. Almost no precedent pro-
vides any indication that a junior user would be allowed any
"expansion room" if the senior user moves into what is still vir-
gin territory.0 It is not immediately apparent why this should
be so. If the two users are truly remote, why should the senior
user have protection against the junior user in an unclaimed
area, while the junior user can have no similar expansion
rights in an area adjacent to that in which the junior user has
all of the functional rights of a senior user?"'
Although the zone of natural expansion doctrine may be seen
as a means to permit business expansion, it is a very imperfect
resolution of the problem. It does not, for example, account for
a circumstance in which the senior user is stagnant while the
76. See Spartan Food Sys., v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (4th Cir. 1987)
(discussing possible use of zone of reputation by junior user).
77. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.03[31; Note, supra note 60, at 1087-89.
78. See, e.g., Raxton Corp. v. Anania Assoc., 635 F.2d 924, 931-32 (1st Cir. 1980);
beef & brew, Inc. v. Beef & Brew, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 179, 185-86 (D. Ore. 1974).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1990).
80. An exception is Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th
Cir. 1987) (discussing possible zone of natural expansion for a junior user).
81. In Note, supra note 60, at 1087 n.68, the author states that "a junior user
who has plans to expand into an area in which a senior user has already established
a market" cannot claim priority based on the "zone of natural expansion" doctrine,
absent bad faith of the senior user. This is because "a junior user cannot acquire
rights that are superior to the senior user's rights within the senior user's area of
use." Id. That begs an important question: What constitutes "bad faith" on the part of
a senior user? If the senior user moves into a new area near junior user's territory
in order to forestall the junior user's expansion, is that bad faith? If so, does it really
matter whether the senior user knows of the junior user's existence? In other words,
must the senior user know that this is the junior user's "natural" territory? If so,
why doesn't this same analysis apply when the junior user "invades" the senior user's
"natural" territory?
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junior user is expanding. 2 A better solution to the problem is
needed.
B. The Requirement of Good Faith
One other aspect of the common law doctrine, alluded to in
the previous discussion, is the requirement that the remote
junior user's initial use be in "good faith." Most courts have
held that if the junior user has actual knowledge of the senior
user then the junior user is per se acting in bad faith." Using
this criterion, even a remote junior user whose use will not be
likely to cause confusion will be enjoined if the junior user
knew about the senior user.84 The most forceful justification
for this principle is that name confusion can be presumed from
the fact of the junior user's knowledge-if the junior user
knows of the other use, so must other people." The junior use-
r's actual knowledge of the senior user leads to the presumption
that the junior user wants to trade on a successful mark."5
However, some courts reject this and look at good faith as a
measure of actual intent to capitalize on another mark."
82. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Weiner King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 517-18 (C.C.P.A.
1980) (discussing appellate decision in a companion case, where the focus was on the
stagnant senior user's zone of reputation).
83. E.g., Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 522 n.6; Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl,
Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Woman's World Shops, Inc. v. Lane
Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 1988 (TTAB 1988). See Money Store v.
Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674-75 (7th Cir. 1982); Alexander & Coil,
supra note 61 at 103; Treece, supra note 39, at 1018-19 (noting the majority rule but
also noting contrary arguments and authority); Comment, supra note 39, at 795 &
nn.70-71; But see GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir.) cert. denied,
498 U.S. 998 (1990); Accu Personnel, Inc. v. Accustaff, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1161, 1167
(D. Del. 1993) (dictum). The draft Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition seems
to take a middle position, calling knowledge a "critical factor" in determining bad
faith, but not controlling in every case. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 19 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990).
84. Comment, supra note 38, at 795-96.
85. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.04.
86. See Comment, supra note 38, at 796.
87. See, e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 649 F. Supp 164, 169 (D. Utah 1986), affd,
904 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) (stating
that mere knowledge is not conclusive); see also Alexander & Coil, supra note 60, at
103-04 & n.8.
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Again, the result is inconsistency and mixed messages to trade-
mark users.'
C. What Constitutes a "Remote" User?
The factor of "remoteness" is similarly vague. Although most
often the users are in different parts of the country, this is not
always the case. In the Manheim"9 decision discussed previous-
ly" the two users were in different parts of the same state.9
Where the marks are not particularly well known, short dis-
tances can be significant. Thus, "remoteness" simply states that
the junior use will not cause confusion with the senior user in
that market.9 2
D. Territoriality Problems
Finally, there is a problem that has become more theoretical
than actual. As described above, if a state court were to issue
an injunction that prohibited use of a trademark outside of the
state, it could encounter a constitutional barrier to its
actions." However, the advent of federal statutory trademark
law has made it an unusual, though not unheard of, circum-
stance in a concurrent user case. Even cases that do not involve
federally registered trademarks can often be brought in federal
court under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects non-
registered, as well as registered, marks.94 Acting under a fed-
eral statute, a federal court unquestionably has the authority to
88. Experience shows, moreover, that courts may strain to avoid findings of bad
faith even where there appears to be actual knowledge. In Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal,
SA, 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992), the court refused to uphold a district court's find-
ing of bad faith. The junior user had discovered the senior user's use of the mark on
related services (a hair salon) but concluded that it did not prevent the use of the
mark on hair care products. The appeals court found the subsequent use not to be in
bad faith. Id. at 504-05. Interestingly, the same junior user paid $125,000 to a feder-
al registrant, whose use of the ZAZU mark was on wholly unrelated products (cloth-
ing), for the right to use the mark. Id. at 501.
89. Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Manhein, 110 P. 23 (Wash. 1910).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49.
91. For a more recent example of remote users within one state, see Chinn v.
Chinn, 514 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
92. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.01[4] at 26-10 to 26-11.
93. See generally Welkowitz, supra note 55.
94. See cases cited infra note 185.
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issue a nationwide injunction. However, a significant number of
cases are still brought in state court; therefore, the problem
cannot be ignored.
The development of common law doctrine since Hanover Star
Milling and Rectanus has done little to overcome the problems
of client counseling, business expansion and territorial restric-
tions on state authority identified in the previous section. The
major "solution" to the problem of allowing for business expan-
sion, the so-called "zone of natural expansion," has proven to be
a failure in practice and is increasingly criticized and reject-
ed. 5 Differences in the way courts treat the requirements for
this zone, and for the element of "good faith," make client coun-
seling difficult. The problems of territoriality have gone largely
unaddressed, no doubt due in part to the increasing federaliza-
tion of trademark law. We now turn to the impact of federal
statutory law on this problem.
IV. THE LANHAM ACT AND THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
The passage in 1946 of the federal trademark statute known
as the Lanham Act somewhat changed the analysis of the geo-
graphic scope of trademarks.96 The federal statute has both
eclipsed and incorporated much of the common law of trade-
marks. Moreover, by providing a consistent, nationwide stan-
95. The problems associated with this doctrine are reminiscent of the problems
faced by another doctrine: "secondary meaning in the making." Like zone of natural
expansion, secondary meaning in the making is a doctrine created to give breathing
space to expanding businesses. It would permit businesses to claim that their marks
have potential consumer associations and that the marks should receive protection
against intentional copying until they have a chance to prove themselves in the mar-
ketplace. Like the zone of natural expansion, this doctrine has been widely criticized
and has been usually rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group,
Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d
576, 581 (2d Cir. 1991); Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d
1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying Second Circuit law); Devan Designs, Inc. v.
Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 2000 (M.D. N.C. 1992). See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, note at 53 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1990) (noting rejection of the doctrine by courts and commentators).
96. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (1988). This subject has been discussed in other
works, and I will only recreate that treatment to the extent necessary to discuss the
issues here. For comprehensive discussions, see, e.g., 2 McCARTHY, supra note 5, §§
26.13 to 26.19; Treece, supra note 38; see also Note, supra note 60.
[Vol. 28:315334
CONCURRENT USE OF TRADEMARKS
dard, the Lanham Act has funneled much of the litigation con-
cerning trademarks into the federal system. Therefore, an ex-
amination must first be made of the degree to which federal
law alters the common law scheme discussed above.
A. Constructive Notice of Prior Use and Nationwide Rights
In many ways, the Lanham Act was simply a federal codifica-
tion of the common law of trademarks.97 However, the Lanham
Act did make some significant changes in the common law. One
of the more significant changes involved the scope of trademark
protection. The underpinning of the common law "Tea Rose"-
Rectanus doctrine is that trademark rights reach only as far as
the actual use or reputation of the mark. In areas where the
senior user has not used the mark, or where it has no reputa-
tion, the senior user has no rights in the mark. Thus, a junior
user who is the first to use the mark in a particular area may
acquire trademark rights in that area that are superior to the
senior user.
The Lanham Act, on the other hand, was intended to give
registrants nationwide rights, even in areas where the mark
had not been used.9" Thus, section 33(a) provides that registra-
tion is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark ... and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the reg-
istered mark in commerce."99 Section 33(b) goes even further
and makes the registration "conclusive" evidence of the
registrant's exclusive rights when the right to use the mark has
become incontestable.' 0
97. Inwood Lab. v. Ives Lab. 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring)
"rIThe purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law of unfair
competition and trademark."); see S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
98. Arthur A. March, Territorial Scope of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 38
TRADEMARK REP. 955, 957 (1948); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.13[2]. As Professor
McCarthy notes, the Lanham Act does not say this in so many words, but it is an
inevitable conclusion from its provisions. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.13[2] at 26-
49.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988). A mark may become incontestable when it has
been used for five consecutive years after registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). There
are certain qualifications to this principle. The registrant must file an affidavit with
the Patent and Trademark Office showing use for five consecutive years. And incon-
testability is not valid against certain defenses. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). A generic
mark, for example, is not entitled to the rights of incontestability. Some other qualifi-
cations are discussed in the text to follow.
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The effect of section 33 is even more significant when viewed
in combination with section 22 of the Lanham Act.10' That
section provides that "[riegistration of a mark on the principal
register provided by this chapter or under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall be constructive no-
tice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof."' 2
By making registration under the federal statute' 3 con-
structive notice of the registrant's claim to the mark, the
Lanham Act attacks a key element of the "good faith" defense
of the remote junior user. Generally, courts have equated "good
faith" with lack of notice of the prior use by the senior
user.0 4 Because registration under the Lanham Act construc-
tively notifies the world of the registrant's existing use of the
mark, a junior user who begins using the mark in question
after registration cannot claim a lack of notice.' 5 Of course,
such a junior user may be operating in subjective good
faith-without actual knowledge-and arguably, therefore, the
common law protection should not be removed unless some
other provision of the Lanham Act demands such a result.
However, the courts generally have interpreted section 22 as
eliminating the good faith defense of a remote junior user
whose first use occurs after registration.' 6 The leading case in
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
102. Id.
103. Registrability generally is governed by sections 1-4 of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-54 (1988).
104. See cases cited supra note 83.
105. Although § 22 speaks in terms of a claim of "ownership," it is reasonable to
equate this with actual use, not constructive use. Section 1(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051(a); allows registration by an existing owner of a mark which is "used
in commerce." In 1988, the Act was amended to permit the filing of an application
for registration based on a "bona fide" intent to use the mark in the near future
(previously, a mark had to have been used in commerce before such application). 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). Moreover, the amended statute provides that the application
to register, including an "intent to use" application, constitutes constructive use of the
mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988). This essentially means that an applicant who ob-
tains a registration can become the statutory "senior user" prior to having actually
used the mark. However, obtaining rights of ownership still depends on actual regis-
tration which, even after the amendments, requires use, not just intent to use. 15
U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1988) (requiring potential intent to use registrant to file statement
of actual use for registration).
106. See, e.g., Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Comercio E Industria Ltd., 747
F. Supp. 122, 127 (D.P.R. 1990); Scientific Applications v. Energy Conservation Corp.
of Am., 436 F. Supp. 354, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1977). The situation differs if the junior
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this regard is Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 107 in
which the Second Circuit stated:
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1072, provides that regis-
tration of a trademark on the principal register is construc-
tive notice of the registrants' claim of ownership. Thus, by
eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of knowledge,
§1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks,
regardless of the areas in which the registrant actually uses
the mark.l0 '
Furthermore, it has been held that, even where the junior user
began using the mark prior to registration, its area of exclusive
use is limited to the geographic area it occupied prior to regis-
tration.1"9
Thus, the constructive notice provision goes hand in hand
with granting nationwide rights to the registrant."' The com-
bined effect of the nationwide exclusivity granted by section 33
and the constructive notice provision"' of section 22, cutting
off a remote junior user's good faith defense, gives a registrant
nationwide rights to the mark that, in theory, are not subject to
enclaves of superior right in a good faith junior (that is, post
registration) user. Unfortunately, as we will see, it does not
eliminate the rights of those who have used the mark prior to
user begins using the mark prior to registration. See infra part IV.C.2.
107. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
108. Id. at 362 (emphasis added). Accord Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co.,
523 F.2d 424, 429 (10th Cir. 1975) (dicta); American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc.,
312 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1963); Davidoff Extension, 747 F. Supp. at 127-28;
Howard Stores Corp. v. Howard Clothing, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 70, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
109. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. LeBlanc, 654 F. Supp. 380, 380-81 (D.N.H. 1987).
110. Though federal trademark statutes existed before the Lanham Act, registration
under those acts did not give constructive notice. See Walter J. Halliday, Constructive
Notice and Concurrent Registration, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 111, 112-18 (1948).
111. The "constructive" nature of this notice can, however, be critical. A poignant
example is Action Temporary Services, Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). Labor Force obtained a federal registration prior to any use of the mark
by Action. Action's first use was two years after the registration, which put it on
constructive notice of the prior registration. However, subsequent to Action's use La-
bur Force's registration was canceled due to an apparently inadvertent failure to file
an affidavit of continuing use. Id. at 1565 (Rich, J., dissenting). Thereafter, the prior
registrant (Labor Force) again filed for registration and Action this time applied for
concurrent registration. Id. at 1565. The court refused to apply the logical conse-
quences of section 22-making Action a "bad faith" user who cannot obtain concurrent
registration-because of the cancellation of the registration. Id. at 1566.
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registration. Thus, the concurrent use problem persists even
with constructive notice.
B. Constructive Use
The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.12 amended the
Lanham Act in some significant ways. Most prominent among
the amendments was a provision permitting an application for
registration to be filed based on a bona fide intent to use the
mark in the near future."' As part of the intent to use an ap-
plication system, section 7(c) of the Lanham Act was rewritten
to provide that the filing of an application for registration con-
stitutes "constructive use" of the mark, conferring nationwide
priority on the applicant."' As a result, a registration applica-
tion cuts off any junior user who does not begin to use the
mark before the senior user files its application."5 This push-
es back the date of nationwide priority beyond that conferred
by section 22 to the date of application. The constructive use
provision should limit the number of possible concurrent use
situations involving registered marks.
The intent of the constructive use provision is two-fold. First,
it provides protection for registration applicants using the "in-
tent to use" procedure. Without some means of protecting such
applicants, others could keep track of intent to use applications
and proceed to use the mark before a registration issues, cut-
ting off the registrant's rights in those geographic areas of use.
Such a result would discourage intent to use applications." 6
Second, it gives owners of marks an additional incentive to
register them."' Moreover, by enacting the constructive use
112. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). Registration does not issue until the applicant
files an affidavit showing actual use of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1988).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
115. One important exception to the constructive use provision is a foreign appli-
cant whose date of priority is dependent on the date it filed for registration in the
foreign country. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c)(3), 1126(d) (1988).
116. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1988); The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Re-
port and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK
REP. 375, 397 (1987) [hereinafter USTA Report].
117. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30
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provision Congress hoped to reduce concurrent use situations
and reduce consumer confusion."'
However, the constructive use provision does not solve the
problem of territorial fragmentation of trademark ownership.
Not all users register, despite the new incentives for doing so.
The continued existence of these "unknown" users means that
even future registraiits may have their rights limited by a prior
user. The law still does not remove rights from common law
users whose first use predates the application for regis-
tration."'
In addition, the interaction of constructive use with prior
users does not always lead to clear results. The United States
Trademark Association, which proposed this provision, stated
that "[i]t would ... be inequitable to permit [the registration]
application to freeze the prior user's right to territorial expan-
sion."' Does this mean that the imputed nationwide use of
section 7(c) is not effective against a prior user? 2' Suppose
the prior user expands solely to preempt the new user?'22 The
statute does not clarify the situation. However, the most rea-
sonable interpretation of section 7(c) is that the applicant is
deemed to have used the mark everywhere in the country. This
would seem to cut off the prior user's rights except in areas of
actual prior use by another and areas where the prior user had
a reputation before the application was filed. In other words,
the prior user should have whatever rights it would have had
at common law against a user whose first use in all areas dates
from the registration application. Given the possible nonuni-
formity of common law doctrines this is not an altogether hap-
py conclusion.
(1988); USTA Report, supra note 114, at 398.
118. SENATE COMi. ON JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30
(1988).
119. See discussion infra part Ill. C.
120. USTA Report, supra note 116, at 398.
121. Once registration issues, however, a prior user's rights are limited. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(5) (1988). See discussion infra part IV. C.
122. This would be a particularly troublesome problem for intent to use applicants.
The prior user could expand before actual use of the mark is made by the applicant.
This would create a disincentive for intent to use applications.
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Moreover, some case law indicates further difficulties with
applying the constructive use provision. In Talk To Me Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Larami Corp.,2 ' the parties disputed the own-
ership of the mark "Soaker" for water guns.'24 Plaintiff relied
in large part on a registration application filed approximately
three weeks before defendant started shipping its products.'25
Plaintiff claimed that, under section 7(c), the application consti-
tuted constructive nationwide use, thereby conferring priority of
ownership. However, at the time of the court's opinion,'26 no
registration had yet been issued by the Patent and Trademark
Office.'27 The statute states that the constructive use priority
conferred by the application is "[c]ontingent on the registration
of a mark upon the principal register ....",2 Thus, the court
was unwilling to give plaintiff the benefit of the constructive
use provision in the absence of a registration.'29
Such a result indicates a troubling gap in the law. If the
"Soaker" decision is correct, then an applicant whose first use of
the mark postdates another's use, but whose application pre-
dates the other's use of the mark is in a kind of limbo until the
registration issues.3 ° If registration issues after the suit, then
one of two things must happen, neither of which is desirable.
Either the registrant suddenly is the first user and now can
enjoin the other user, or the other user is grandfathered as a
lawful concurrent user. The latter seems inimical to Congress'
intent in passing the statute, yet the first result is also trou-
bling. There is no certainty that a registration will issue; thus
we should not discourage others from using the mark until
123. 804 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 992 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1993).
124. Plaintiff was the licensor of a product called "The Totally Rad Soaker" and
defendant manufactured and sold a product called "Super Soaker." Id. at 556-57.
Defendant's product had gained widespread publicity by the time of the court's opin-
ion. See id. at 557 n.3 (noting that some states even proposed banning Super Soakers
because of reported injuries from its use).
125. Id. at 559.
126. Plaintiffs suit was filed in 1991. Id. at 557.
127. Although plaintiff filed an application for registration in July 1990, the Notice
of Publication was not issued until August 1991. Id.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
129. 804 F. Supp. at 560.
130. The applicant cannot rely on the constructive notice provisions of § 22 to es-
tablish bad faith use by the other party because that section only applies upon regis-
tration, not application. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
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registration.13 ' But, if we then remove the rights of those who
begin using the mark after another's application upon the issu-
ance of that registration, we will inhibit second users and, in
effect, give the as yet unregistered user an unearned priority of
use."12 Neither result is very good. Moreover, if registration
does not issue, the first actual user appears entitled to priority.
However, the applicant may have relied on the fact that the
law gives it six months to use the mark and held off on actual
use.1
3
The conclusion of this analysis is that even Congress' recent
attempts to ameliorate the problem of concurrent use with the
concept of constructive use will not solve the problem. 3 1
C. Exceptions to Nationwide Rights
1. The Requirement of Confusion
Because the Lanham Act codified much of the common law, it
should not surprise anyone to discover that much of the struc-
131. If a potential user were to search the Patent and Trademark Office publica-
tions, it would find the application. This would put that potential user on notice of
the priority of the applicant. See USTA Report, supra note 117, at 398 (expressing
hope that constructive use provision would encourage searches of PTO filings). Such
knowledge, coupled with the knowledge of the implications of constructive use, would
scare off many users. But for those who wish to take the risk that the mark will not
be registered, issuance of an injunction before a registration is granted certainly
would be enough to prevent use. And, if no registration ultimately issues, the poten-
tial user has been discouraged without the applicant ever being required to use the
mark. On the other hand, that may be one of the tradeoffs for an intent to use sys-
tem.
132. Again, this may not be a bad thing. It may just be the inevitable price of the
new system.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (1988). It may be that the statute encourages use, and
the result reached by the constructive use provision, at least where no registration
issues, is not unfair.
134. In fact, there is another difficulty exposed by the Talk to Me Products opin-
ion. In another portion of the opinion the court went on to hold that "Soaker" was a
descriptive mark and thus required the secondary meaning to be protected. 804 F.
Supp. at 562-63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (). However, defendant had made such ex-
tensive use of the mark in the interim that its product, not plaintiffs, had
established secondary meaning in the mark. 804 F. Supp. at 563-64. At that point, it
was unlikely that plaintiff could establish the necessary prerequisites for a registrable
mark. Thus, the protections of § 7(c) seem rather ephemeral for the intended user of
a descriptive mark in the face of an aggressive second user whose first use predates
registration.
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ture of the common law's "Tea Rose"-Rectanus doctrine is still
found in the Lanham Act."3 5 Despite its appearance of nation-
wide coverage, the Lanham Act does not give a registrant an
unqualified nationwide priority against another user of the
mark in areas where the senior user has yet to use the mark.
One limitation on a registrant's rights is contained in the
Dawn Donut3 ' case. The plaintiff-registrant in that case had
not yet entered the territory of the junior user and its mark
had no reputation in the junior user's territory. Under those
facts, even though the registrant was the senior user of the
mark, and even though the junior user began using the mark
after it was registered (and was thus subject to the constructive
notice provision), the court refused to grant an injunction
against the junior user.3 7 The reason is found in section 32 of
the Lanham Act,'38 which deals with the remedies for in-
fringement of registered marks. Section 32 permits the court to
enforce the rights of a registrant against another whose use of
the registered mark "is likely to cause confusion,... mistake
or to deceive."'39 Because the registrant's mark was not
known in the junior user's territory, the court reasoned that, at
present, there was no likelihood of confusion. 4 ° Therefore, the
injunction was denied. However, the court did say that when
and if the registrant entered the junior user's territory, the
registrant would be entitled to an injunction.' Thus, in the
words of Professor McCarthy, the junior user now was living on
"borrowed time." Nevertheless, as a result of Dawn Donut,
the junior user can continue to use the mark until the regis-
trant decides to enter its territory.
135. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1988) (effectively
giving one who used the mark before registration a defense to an infringement suit
by the registrant); id. § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988) (allowing any equitable or
legal defenses that would exist at common law, including the Tea Rose defense, to be
shown in a suit by a registrant whose right to exclusive use of the mark is still
"contestable"); id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988) (making incontestability subject to
existing rights of other users under state law).
136. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
137. Id. at 369.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
139. Id. § 1114(1)(a).
.140. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364-65.
141. Id. at 365.
142. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §_26.14(1) at 26-52.
143. See, e.g., American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 626 (5th
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This is a very unsatisfactory conclusion. A defendant is now
permitted to continue using the mark, possibly enhancing the
connection between the mark and defendant among local con-
sumers, until such time as plaintiff enters the defendant's mar-
ket area. At that point, the defendant's use will be enjoined.'
While one may not have much sympathy for a defendant who
continues to use a mark knowing it is on "borrowed time,"145
the trademark laws supposedly protect consumers from confus-
ing uses of the mark. When plaintiff now moves into
defendant's territory it is likely that the defendant's customers
will be confused. They may think that the registered user is im-
properly encroaching on the non-registrant's good will. 46 This
problem is exacerbated by permitting the defendant to continue
to use the offending mark even after it becomes clear that the
mark is "confusingly similar" to plaintiffs mark." 7 It would
have been far better to eliminate the confusion early, rather
than allow it to grow."
This may have been an avoidable problem. One may assume
that confusion was likely if both competitors used the "Dawn"
Cir. 1963); Modular Cinemas of Am., Inc. v. Mini Cinema Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578,
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
144. Presumably, if plaintiffs mark becomes known in defendant's market area,
that also would trigger the right to injunctive relief. An interesting twist on the prob-
lem is found in Tree Tavern Prods. Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., Id. 1263 (D. Del. 1986).
Plaintiff indisputably was the senior user and incontestable federal registrant prior to
defendant's use of the mark ("Side Dish"). Although the court granted plaintiffs re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, it permitted the defendant to continue selling
infringing goods in areas outside the areas in which plaintiffs products were sold
and, apparently, to advertise the goods throughout the country. Id. at 1273. This
virtually reduced plaintiff to the role of lawful junior user. Though one assumes plai-
ntiff's good faith expansion would eliminate defendant's right to continue sales in
other territories, defendant was a large national food seller and plaintiff ran a serious
risk of a reverse confusion situation, where purchasers think that defendant, not
plaintiff, is the rightful owner of the mark. Id. at 1269-72.
145. Following the 1988 amendments adding the constructive use provisions, the
junior user would seem to be limited to the area of actual use prior to the filing of
the intent to use application.
146. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365,
1371 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that the second user of mark caused "reverse confu-
sion," making people think that the first user was not the owner of the mark).
147. That is, if the marks were used in the same geographic location, the two
would be confusingly similar.
148. See Julius R. Lunsford, Geographic Scope of Registered Rights-Then and
Now, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 411, 418-20 (1971) (criticizing the result in Dawn Donut
and noting criticism of the opinion by Walter Derenberg).
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mark on the same or similar goods in the same geographic
area. The only reason the court did not grant an injunction was
that plaintiffs current use was geographically remote from
defendant's use; therefore, the court concluded that no present
confusion was likely. If plaintiffs mark had been nationally
known, even if the product was not sold locally, this conclusion
would surely be wrong. However, even with a lesser known
mark plaintiff arguably should have prevailed. The statute
requires only that confusion be "likely," not actual or definite.
Given the identity of the marks and the similarity of the prod-
ucts on which they were used, confusion is "likely" at some
point. If this seems to stretch the statutory language beyond
the breaking point, consider the absurdity of the actual result.
Consumers will be confused-indeed, they may unfairly believe
that the registrant is the interloper to the detriment of the
registrant's reputation. It is a flawed scheme indeed that fos-
ters both confusion and bad business planning, for Dawn (the
registrant) now will be encouraged to go into new territory
merely to forestall the future damage to its reputation.
2. The "Limited Area" Defense
Another important limitation of nationwide rights is found in
section 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act.' This section creates the
so-called "limited area" defense to a registered mark. If a ju-
nior, non-registered user began its use of the mark prior to the
time that the senior user filed an application to register the
mark, then the junior user has a defense to the otherwise con-
clusive, nationwide right of the registrant.50 In short, the ju-
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1988).
150. Prior to the enactment of § 7(c) in 1988, the junior user would only have had
to use the mark before a registration issued. Under § 7(c), an application for regis-
tration constitutes nationwide constructive use of the mark, contingent on registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988). This is consistent with § 15, which grants incontestable
status to the use of a mark "except to the extent [that the registered mark] infringes
a valid right acquired under the law of any State or Territory by use of a mark
[prior to registration]." 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). Technically, the defenses listed in §
33(b) relate only to marks whose owners have incontestable rights to use the marks
on the goods stated in their registrations. However, § 33(a), which deals with marks
that are not yet incontestable, expressly incorporates the defenses listed in § 33(b). 15
U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988). Thus, the limited area defense applies to all registered
marks. See supra text accompanying nn.26-76.
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nior user can then invoke the common law "Tea Rose"-Rectanus
defense, with one important proviso: "[Tihis defense [used prior
to registration] or defect shall apply only for the area in
which ... continuous prior use is proved."15' Thus, once the
senior user registers the mark, the junior user's territory is
frozen. No further expansion is permitted, even though the
junior user's first use was prior to the registration.'52 Further-
more, state law cannot grant the junior user a wider area of
protection; the limits expressed in section 33(b)(5) preempt any
state law to the contrary. 5 ' Finally, as at common law, the
junior user may enjoin the senior user from using the trade-
mark in the area assigned to the junior user.'
The statutory defense does not mention the "remoteness"
requirement of the common law.'55 Nevertheless, it makes
sense to require both remoteness and good faith to be shown by
the junior user."' This is because section 33(b)(5) simply re-
moves the conclusive presumption of validity, forcing the parties
into the "Tea Rose"-Rectanus situation, except as expressly lim-
ited by the statute, which includes both elements.'57
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1988).
152. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.18[2] at 26-75.
153. Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 1968) (find-
ing that even if Illinois law granted statewide rights to the junior user, federal law
limits the junior user to the area of actual use prior to registration); Quill Corp. v.
LeBlanc, 654 F. Supp. 380, 385 (D.N.H. 1987). The junior user may, however, be
allowed to expand its operations within this prior use area. Concord Lab., Inc. v.
Concord Medical Ctr., 552 F. Supp. 549, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
154. Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d at 909 (affirming injunction
against senior user for a limited area in Illinois).
155. The statute does incorporate an element of good faith by requiring that the
junior user have adopted the mark "without knowledge" of the senior user. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(5) (1988).
156. See, e.g., Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 366 (6th
Cir. 1984) (stating that plaintiff is entitled to use the "good faith prior use" defense);
Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see
Dana Corp. v. Racal Elecs. Pub. Ltd., No. 85-C428 1987 WL 18948, *4-*5 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (stating that § 33(b)(5) simply removes the presumption of protection and per-
mits junior user to show a common law defense, which includes requirement of geo-
graphic remoteness). But see Concord Lab., Inc. v. Concord Medical Ctr., 552 F. Supp.
549, 552, n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to require remoteness).
157. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.18[3][a]. Until 1989, the defense provided
by § 33(b)(5) technically was only applicable to marks that had become incontestable.
However, the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 expressly incorporated the defens-
es available under § 33(b) into ,§ 33(a), which deals with marks that are contestable.
Thus, the defense is expressly available as against any registered mark. That is not
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As a result of section 33(b)(5), the common law defense lives
on in the Lanham Act.15 The remote good faith junior user
can still claim priority in its area of use. The Lanham Act sim-
ply adds a few restrictions to the common law defense: the use
must predate registration (or even the application to register),
be limited to the area of prior continuous use, and cannot be
expanded by state law.
a major change in doctrine; courts had assumed for years that the § 33(b)(5) defense
was available against contestable marks as well as those that were incontestable. 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.18[4]. The 1988 amendments simply codified that in-
terpretation. Id.
Technically, contestable marks also are subject to any common law defenses as
well. However, the analogous common law defense is the "Tea Rose"-Rectanus defense.
Although in theory a state might grant wider protection, the parameters of that de-
fense generally follow that of § 33(b)(5)-the junior user's protection is coextensive
with its area of use. See generally 2 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.18[4].
158. One facet of this discussion has been omitted. There are some marks which
are not inherently distinctive. These marks are normally those that are descriptive of
the goods or services with which they are used. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v.
United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968): "[a] term is
descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, quality or
characteristic of the goods.") Such marks are only given protection when the user
shows that they have developed a "secondary meaning"-that is, that the public un-
derstands the mark as identifying a unique source, rather than as describing the
product. Id. at 10. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 11.041], 11.09, 15.02. The scope
of territorial protection is a bit trickier for such marks. At common law, the territori-
al scope of protection was only as great as the territorial scope of the secondary
meaning. See, e.g., Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F.2d 696, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1951);
Buscemi's, Inc. v. Anthony Buscemi's Delicatessen & Party Store, Inc., 294 N.W.2d
218, 219 (Mich. App. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt.
b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990). Thus, if the mark had secondary meaning in one
area, but not another, it was only protected where secondary meaning was shown.
The Lanham Act permits registration of descriptive marks only when secondary
meaning is shown. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988). Professor McCarthy indicates that proof
of secondary meaning in a very small area may not be enough. 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 15.23[4]. But he does not assert that proof need be nationwide, and it is
not obvious that such a showing is required by the statute. However, once registered,
the rights granted by the statute are nationwide. On the other hand, the requirement
of likely confusion for a successful infringement suit will effectively limit the territo-
rial scope of protection to areas where the mark has secondary meaning. Moreover,
others are allowed to use the mark in its purely descriptive sense (i.e., not as a
trademark) to describe their own products. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,
Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
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3. Junior User as Registrant
Because the Lanham Act generally confers rights on regis-
trants, there is a situation that can arise under the Lanham
Act for which there is no common law equivalent. This situa-
tion occurs where the registrant is not the senior user within
the United States. Under the common law, a junior user can
gain priority within its area of use. However, registration under
the Lanham Act gives a registrant nationwide priority, even in
areas where the registrant has not used the mark, excepting
only areas where a prior user exists.
Nothing in the Lanham Act prevents a junior user who is the
first to file for registration from becoming the registered user of
a mark. Nevertheless, it creates an awkward situation for a se-
nior user whose "good faith" cannot be questioned. If the junior
user's right to use the mark becomes incontestable 59 one first
looks to section 33(b) of the Lanham Act for any possible de-
fenses available to the senior, non-registered user. Section 33(b)
states that the rights of incontestability apply only "[t]o the
extent that the right to use the registered mark has become
incontestable under section 15 ... , Under section 15, in-
contestability is limited
to the extent, if any, to which the use of a mark registered
on the principal register infringes a valid right acquired
under the law of any State or Territory by use of a mark or
trade name continuing from a date prior to the date of
registration under this chapter of such registered
mark .... 161
Thus, a senior user who has acquired rights prior to the junior
user's registration. 2 retains those rights even in the face of a
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988)). This language was
added to § 33(b) by the 1988 amendments to the Lanham Act. No similar language
existed before that time. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.19 at 26-87 to 26-88.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
162. As Professor McCarthy notes, the constructive use provisions of § 7(c), which
make applications for registration equivalent to use of the mark, do not apply here. 2
McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.19. That is because, by definition, the junior user
registrant will have filed its application after the senior user began using the mark.
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junior user's incontestable status. However, the rights of the
non-registered senior user are only those granted by the com-
mon law, which normally means by the "Tea Rose"-Rectanus
scheme.'63 That scheme only grants territorial rights based on
actual use or reputation. In other words, the senior user's
rights are limited to its area of actual use or reputation at the
time of the junior user's registration. Once registration occurs,
the senior user's territorial rights are frozen.'
If the right to use the mark has not yet become incontest-
able, then section 33(a) relegates the registration to the status
of prima facie evidence of a superior right, but subject to any
defenses that would exist at common law, including the "Tea
Rose"-Rectanus defense. This does not appear to lead to a fun-
damentally different result than that achieved under section
33(b), as illustrated in Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King
Corp."'65 In Weiner King, the registered junior user (without an
incontestable registration), who pursued an aggressive franchis-
ing operation, was granted nationwide rights, while the senior
user, who had remained local, was confined to its local trade
area in one state.'66
In both situations then, the effect of the Lanham Act is to
grant a registered junior user nationwide rights, subject only to
any preexisting rights of a non-registered senior user. However,
this seemingly simple analysis hides some awkward and diffi-
163. The senior user here is not able to invoke the defense contained in § 33(b)(5)
because that section applies only where the registrant is the national senior user. 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1988) (the mark must have been "adopted without knowledge of
the registrant's prior use") (emphasis added).
164. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 26.19 at 26-88 to 26-90 and cases cited in notes
12 and 15 therein. Interestingly, this analysis presumes either that states do not
grant statewide rights without statewide use-which is generally true-or that a
"valid right acquired under the law of any State ... by use . . . " means that only
rights coextensive with actual use will be recognized as a defense-to incontestability.
The former seems to be assumed by the cases and commentators without reaching
the latter point. Professor McCarthy alludes to competing policies when he says that
the policy of rewarding federal registration supports limiting a non-registered senior
user to areas of actual use. Id. at 26-89 to 26-90. However, he does not attempt
explicitly to tie that policy to the language of § 15.
165. 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
166. Id. at 523. The court granted the senior user a concurrent registration under
§ 2(d) of the Lanham Act, but limited the senior user's territory to its existing trade
area. Id. at 524. See Architemps Inc. v. Architemps Ltd., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885,
1887 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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cult questions. Foremost among these questions is that of the
junior user's good faith. At some point, perhaps even before
registration, the junior user will find out about the senior user.
To what degree will that affect the junior user's rights?
In theory, if a junior user knows of the senior user before
ever using the mark, that knowledge eliminates any claim of
"good faith" subsequent use, even if the subsequent use is in a
geographically remote location. However, as noted above, the
"good faith" requirement is not strictly adhered to in all cas-
es.'67 What of a junior user who honestly and correctly be-
lieves that its use will be so geographically remote that there
would be no likelihood of confusion?68
Even if one applies the "no-knowledge-before-use" require-
ment strictly, what happens once the parties discover one an-
other after they have been using the mark in remote areas, but
before registration? In Weiner King, the court held that a junior
user, who discovered the senior user after its own use began,
was entitled to expand its use of the mark after acquiring that
knowledge. However, Weiner King involved a very static, local
senior user facing an expanding junior user.'69 Suppose in-
stead that both users expanded before registration occurred? In
theory, the common law permits the junior user to expand, ex-
cept where the territory is occupied by the senior user, within
the senior user's "zone of natural expansion," or where the
expansion is primarily done to inhibit the senior user's ex-
pansion. '' If the junior user knows about the senior user, it
is unclear whether this inhibits expansion, especially if the
original use was a "good faith remote" use. Once the junior user
registers, the senior user's expansion must cease, however."'
167. See sources cited supra note 84.
168. Something like this occurred in Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499
(7th Cir. 1992). Defendant was planning a line of faddish hair coloring products and
conducted a search for possible trademark conflicts with the proposed name - ZAZU.
Although its search turned up the fact that plaintiff was using ZAZU as a tradename
for its hair salon and was planning to, but had not yet begun to, create a line of
ZAZU hair products, the court held that this knowledge was not sufficient to justify a
finding of bad faith. Id. at 504-05.
169. A similar situation existed in Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner &
Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985), where the court indicated that the key issue was
the territorial extent of the senior user's market penetration at the time of the junior
user's registration. Id. at 1394.
170. See Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 522.
171. One caveat is that the senior user should be able to rely on any state provi-
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But this leaves a very unsatisfactory state of affairs for both
parties. Even worse, it sets up numerous possibilities for con-
sumer confusion.
D. Concurrent Registration
The Lanham Act contains another provision to deal with
concurrent use situations, though its effect is rather unsatisfac-
tory. Section 2(d) expressly allows concurrent use by permitting,
under certain circumstances, more than one user of a mark to
obtain a valid federal registration: 72
Provided, That if the Commissioner determines that confu-
sion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the
continued use by more than one person of the same or
similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the
mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in
connection with which such marks are used, concurrent
registrations may be issued to such persons when they have
become entitled to use such marks as a result of their con-
current lawful use in commerce prior to (1) the earliest of
the filing dates of the applications pending or of any regis-
tration issued under this chapter .... Use prior to the
filing date of any pending application or a registration shall
not be required when the owner of such application or reg-
istration consents to the grant of a concurrent registration
to the applicant. Concurrent registrations may also be is-
sued by the Commissioner when a court of competent juris-
diction has finally determined that more than one person is
entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In
issuing concurrent registrations, the Commissioner shall
prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place
of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with
which such mark is registered to the respective persons. 7'
Concurrent registrations do not cover the panoply of situations
in which a lawful concurrent use may exist. Concurrent regis-
sions permitting "natural expansion" because the limits of § 33(b)(5) of the Lanham
Act do not apply to nonregistered senior users. By its terms, § 33(b)(5) only applies
where the registrant is the prior user.
172. On the procedure for obtaining a concurrent registration see generally 2 MC-
CARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 20.22-.23.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
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trations can only issue after concurrent use proceedings in the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or after a court proceeding.
If the former, the concurrent use must have existed before the
first application to register was filed. 74 Furthermore, concur-
rent registrations can only issue "if the Commissioner [of the
PTO] determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not
likely to result" from the concurrent use or if a court finds that
"more than one person is entitled to sue the same or similar
marks in commerce."75 In concurrent use proceedings in the
PTO, it is generally true that the senior user is entitled to any
"unclaimed" territory,76 although this presumption may be
overcome if there is evidence that the senior user does not
intend to expand."
However, concurrent registration falls short as a solution to
the problem of concurrent use of trademarks. The primary prob-
lem is that it permits concurrent users, and even strengthens
the claim of the concurrent user to proprietary rights in the
mark.' In order for the PTO to issue concurrent registra-
tions, the office must be convinced that confusion will not result
from its actions. Although this seems to eliminate the most
serious problem with concurrent use, it does so at a great cost.
Assuming that there are two users7 ' of the mark on the same
or similar goods, this requirement mandates that they be geo-
graphically remote and relatively unknown outside their respec-
tive territories at the time of registration. But suppose one of
them begins to build a strong regional reputation. Even if that
user does not take steps to advertise outside its allotted territo-
174. Id. This is comparable to § 7(c), which makes the application for registration
constructive nationwide use of the mark, and § 33(b)(5), which allows a limited de-
fense to one who used the mark prior to registration.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
176. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
177. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.. 1980)
(granting most of the territory to the junior user, who was the first to register the
mark).
178. It appears that, when enacted, concurrent registration was viewed as a tempo-
rary, but necessary evil, to cope with existing concurrent use situations. It evidently
was not viewed as something that would be used extensively after the passage of the
Lanham Act and registration became common. See Halliday, supra note 110, at 121
(quoting from hearings on the Lanham Act).
179. The statute is not so limited. However, it makes for an easier discussion to
assume two users.
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ry, there is nothing to prevent the national media from report"
ing about this high quality business. If that user becomes na-
tionally known without any efforts on its part, that could en-
gender confusion. If the marks have become incontestable, what
then?
Furthermore, concurrent registration poses a business plan-
ning problem. If the registration allots less than the whole
country in order to keep confusion at bay, each user's potential
for expansion, at least under that mark, is limited. Concurrent
registration thus assumes a rather static business situation. A
modern business cannot be static if it hopes to survive. Al-
though well intentioned, the concurrent registration provision
does not overcome the basic problems inherent in concurrent
use situations.
E. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and Common Law Doctrine
Although the Lanham Act is directed primarily at registra-
tion and remedies for owners of registered marks, it has long
been recognized that the statute also provides protection for
unregistered marks used in commerce. This protection is afford-
ed under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits
"[fMalse designations of origin and false descriptions."18 ° The
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). That provision states:
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser-
vices, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false desig-
nation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with anoth-
er person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or anoth-
er person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes
any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or in-
strumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any
State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be
subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to
the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
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concept of "false designation of origin" might have been limited
to affirmative (false) statements of the place of manufacture of
particular goods, but courts have read the provision more
broadly, using it to give protection against infringement to
unregistered trademarks and to the trade dress of goods in
commerce.'81 Moreover, the 1988 amendments to the Lanham
Act made it clear that many of the remedies for infringement of
registered marks are available to protect unregistered marks
under section 43(a). 8 2
Section 43(a) does not set forth any standard for the geo-
graphic scope of protection for trademarks. Because it is a fed-
eral statute, federal courts would have the authority to fill in
this gap with federal "common law."'83 That federal law could
differ markedly from existing common law. In theory, a federal
court might interpret federal common law to grant greater
rights to a senior user than is the case under state common
law using the "Tea Rose"-Rectanus doctrine. However, it would
be anomalous for federal common law to give an unregistered
user greater rights than those afforded registrants under the
Lanham Act. Therefore, one would not expect federal common
law to exclude a good faith remote junior user from using the
(b) Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provi-
sions of this section shall not be imported into the United States or
admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States.. The own-
er, importer, or consignee of goods refused entry at any customhouse
under this section may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is
given under the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given
by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry or seized.
181. Some more recent cases include: GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 542
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); Raxton Corp. v. Anania Assocs.,
Inc., 668 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1982). Section 43(a) was amended by the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988. However, the most significant changes clarified the status
of § 43(a) as a basis for a false advertising suit, more or less codifying and expand-
ing many significant court rulings that used § 43(a) for that purpose. 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 5, § 27.02[21 at 27-16.
182. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2), 1116(a), 1117(1), 1118 (1988), all of which refer
specifically to suits under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
183. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (use of fed-
eral common law in labor disputes under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1988)). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTiON § 6.3 (1989). Technical-
ly, it might be more precise to describe such action as filling in the gaps of a statu-
tory scheme, rather than wholesale creation of common law. However, I have chosen
to adopt the commonly used phrase "federal common law" for this situation.
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mark completely. Moreover, because the constructive notice and
constructive use provisions of the Lanham Act only apply to
registered marks, it is hard to envision a federal court holding
that use without registration gives nationwide priority under
section 43(a). 84 In practice, however, the federal courts have
used the basic "Tea Rose"-Rectanus structure when deciding
cases under section 43(a).8 5
The major benefit of section 43(a) is in overcoming the terri-
torial limits of state authority. A federal court acting under a
federal statute should have the power to issue an injunction
that crosses state boundaries. Beyond that, however, there
appears to be little difference between federal common law
under section 43(a) and state common law in most
instances.'86
V. SUMMARY-BASIC FLAWS IN CONCURRENT USE
Whether statutory or common law, the current approaches
and solutions to the concurrent use problem have two common
flaws. Most prominent is that by permitting concurrent uses
these approaches leave in place a situation destined to cause
consumer confusion. As a corollary, all of the existing approach-
es will cause business planning problems for the lawful users of
the mark.
184. Obviously, without registration there is not even a theoretical way to "notify"
other users beyond actual notification. Moreover, this would make § 7(c) superfluous
for other than intent to use applications.
185. See, e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 542 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d
837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987); Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th
Cir. 1987); Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285, 289-90 (2d Cir.
1972); Genny's Diner & Pub, Inc. v. Sweet Daddy's Inc., 812 F. Supp. 744, 747-48
(W.D. Ky. 1993). This is not really surprising since the Hanover Star Milling and
Rectanus cases both were decided under general federal "common law" principles.
186. See generally Genny's Diner & Pub, Inc. v. Sweet Daddy's Inc., 812 F. Supp.
744 (W.D. Ky. 1993). The plaintiff-senior user asked the court to issue a nationwide
injunction against the defendant-junior user. Id. at 748. Plaintiff apparently feared
that defendant would expand into areas which, while not presently within its trading
area, would inhibit future expansion. Plaintiff based its request for nationwide relief
on federal common law. Id. The court declined to issue a nationwide injunction, not-
ing that defendant had a pending registration application with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, and expressing some uncertainty about the scope of plaintiffs rights
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 747-48.
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Under both the common law and statutory schemes, the most
prevalent result is two lawful users of the mark on the same or
similar goods or services.'87 Even if each party has a right to
preclude the other from encroaching on its territory there will
be confusion. For example, after the decision in Burger King of
Florida, Inc. v. Hoots,' a small Burger King in Matoon, Illi-
nois can continue to use the "Burger King" mark in the area
around Matoon and it can exclude the national Burger King
chain from operating there. In fact, the local restaurant can
expand within its area of exclusive use, strengthening local
identification with the non-registered junior user of the
mark.'89 This is rather absurd. Perhaps residents of Matoon
who have lived there long enough have learned to distinguish
between the two Burger King food emporia. However, anyone
from outside Matoon coming into town would assume that the
local Burger King is associated with the national chain.9 ' The
local restaurant probably gains business because of that as-
sumption, which is business it did not earn.
The problem is even more complex when the business is a
mail order company, rather than a fast food restaurant with a
fixed location. Quill Corp. v. Le Blanc9  was such a case. It
involved a mail order seller of office supplies with a registered
mark, Quill, against a local office supply store using the same
mark. The local store began using the mark before its registra-
187. The constructive notice provision of the Lanham Act sometimes precludes a
second user, but only where the later users begin using the mark after registration
by the first user, and then only if there is an immediate likelihood of confusion.
Similarly, constructive use pushes back the date of priority, but the availability of an
injunction presumably also is limited by the need to show present likelihood of confu-
sion.
188. 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
189. See, e.g., Concord Lab., Inc. v. Concord Medical Ctr., 552 F. Supp. 549, 552
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
190. The national Burger King might have argued that the Illinois Anti-Dilution
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986), should apply to prevent
the local Burger King from operating under that name. However, the Lanham Act
expressly grants a form of defense, or at least a specific removal of registrant's incon-
testable rights, to the junior user. While one could argue that a dilution claim is not
the same as an infringement, upholding a dilution claim based on state law would
give states the power to countermand a limitation of federal rights contained in a
federal statute. But see Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir.
1980) (stats law may give greater protection to federal registrant than the Lanham
Act).
191. 654 F. Supp. 380 (D.N.H. 1987).
1994] 355
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:315
tion by the plaintiff mail order company. Therefore, it was
entitled to use the mark in its area of pre-registration use un-
der section 33(b)(5).'92 Meanwhile, the defendant had been
sending out catalogues, beginning a small mail order business
of its own. This left the court with difficult issues, some of
which its opinion does not answer. 9 3 Both parties operated in
New Hampshire, a small state. Defining a geographic section of
the state where the plaintiff could not operate would be a diffi-
cult task. Would the plaintiff be precluded from taking orders if
people in the defendant's exclusive zone tried to place them?
Suppose a customer received a catalog in the plaintiffs area
but wanted delivery in the defendant's area? And what of the
fact that the change in the nature, if not the geographic scope,
of the defendant's business-adding mail orders-made confu-
sion between the two more likely?' It would be too expensive
for the plaintiff to operate a separate company in the defen-
dant's marketing area; this means a lessening of competition
and, possibly, higher prices for consumers.
Advertising presents another serious problem for the limited
area defense. For example, in Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v.
Thrift Cars, Inc.,' the remote junior user's area of operation
was limited to a single city.9 ' However, because the junior
user had advertised in publications outside that area prior to
registration, the court permitted it to continue advertising in
those publications.'97 The court admitted "that some consumer
confusion may result because there will be some overlap in
advertising, [but] the Lanham Act does not require the com-
192. Id. at 384-85.
193. The opinion decided a motion for summary judgment. Though recognizing the
existence of the limited area defense under the Lanham Act, the court did not believe
that sufficient undisputed facts existed to determine the scope of the defendant's
market area. Id. at 386.
194. Arguably, this was a territorial expansion beyond the "area in which
[defendant's] prior continuous use is proved" and thus should have been barred by §
33(b)(5).
195. 831 F.2d 1177 (1st Cir. 1987).
196. This was the area of actual use prior to the senior user's registration. The
court properly held that the junior user was not entitled to continue operations in
areas into which it had expanded after the mark was federally registered. Id. at
1182-83.
197. Id. at 1184.
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plete elimination of all confusion."'98 Obviously, this is a seri-
ous problem. In the Thrifty case, the area of advertising was
fairly small and probably did not cause great difficulties. The
problems would be even larger if the junior user's territory
were greater than a small city in Massachusetts. 99 They
would be compounded if the publications in which the junior
user advertised suddenly expanded circulation or were merged
into larger publications. Moreover, the issue of advertising has
another side; a court may restrict the senior user from certain
types of advertising in the junior user's area of use.2"' This
does great harm to the value of a national mark that is subject
to the limited area defense. If the senior user is a national
restaurant chain like Burger King, then it is losing potential
business in areas of legitimate use because potentially mobile
consumers cannot receive its advertising.
The Lanham Act's boldest step toward solving this problem,
constructive notice, is undercut by its insistence on protecting
the remote junior user. Furthermore, the Dawn Donut rule,
refusing to issue injunctions in cases where the registrant is
not currently trading in the junior user's area, is a glaring
example of the problems of concurrent use that continue under
the statute. The junior user is without any equitable argument
at all, yet is permitted to build a following with the mark.
Even though this use can be halted by a move on the part of
the senior user into the junior users territory, it leaves in its
wake inevitable consumer confusion. This rule is surely ripe for
abandonment.
These cases suggest that leaving concurrent uses in place is a
poor idea in an era of nationwide advertising and consumer
mobility. The constructive use provisions of the 1988 amend-
ments to the law will ameliorate this problem to some degree,
but will not eliminate it altogether. Unfortunately, as discussed
198. Id.
199. Cf. Tree Tavern Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1263, 1273 (D.
Del. 1986) (permitting defendant, a national seller, to advertise nationally).
200. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 750, 757, affd, 831
F.2d 1177 (1st Cir. 1987); cf Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Indus., 503 F.2d 729,
731-32 (8th Cir. 1974) (forcing the lawful concurrent user to put disclaimers in na-
tional advertisements). But see Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 266 A.2d
87, 92 (Pa. 1970) (denying remote user's request to enjoin advertisements within
remote user's exclusive area of operations), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
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above, the current wording of the Lanham Act insures that this
problem will continue.
Under the common law, the prospects for consumer confusion
are, if anything, even worse than under the Lanham Act. The
Lanham Act usually allocates the entire country between the
registrant and the "remote" concurrent user.0 1 The common
law doctrine is based on actual use. Therefore, it allocates only
those areas where the users are actually using the mark. Any
areas not currently served by either side (and not within the
zone of natural expansion, where that doctrine is applicable)
appear to be fair game for either side, or perhaps even a third
party. In time, then, there may be many users of one mark
around the country. However, unless the users remain very
small and localized there will come a time when their areas of
use and/or reputation will begin to overlap. At that point there
will be consumer confusion. Finally, the common law is subject
to nonuniformity. Some states will be more lenient about proof.
Some states will accept the zone of natural expansion doctrine.
Moreover, limits on the territorial authority of states may make
uniformity a problem even with respect to a particular user.
This makes the scope of protection somewhat dependent on the
location of the lawsuit.
In theory, concurrent registration could avoid this problem
because the statute specifically requires a finding that no confu-
sion result for the concurrent registrations to issue.0 2 But
that is an impractical hope unless the parties involved are
either very remote or very small. Moreover, businesses that
have not taken advantage of the usual registration process are
hardly likely to attempt the procedure for concurrent registra-
tions. And that brings us to the second common problem: busi-
ness planning.
Concurrent use can affect business planning in several ways.
It can restrict the ability of each side to expand, particularly if
201. In the case of concurrent registrations there may be areas of the country not
allocated to any user as a means of forestalling confusion. Otherwise, registration
should allocate the entire country to the registrant(s), except in those areas where a
lawful remote concurrent user exists. See In re Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d 466, 474
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
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the respective territories of exclusive use are large. In order to
do business in the other's territory, each user must adopt a
new mark for the other territory. This makes national advertis-
ing more difficult and prevents developing a single national or
even regional image, united by a single mark. One user could
purchase the other's mark, but it is likely to be costly because
the other side is in a very favorable bargaining position."'
The alternative is to adopt an entirely new mark, as Exxon did
some years ago. This is a very costly decision, both in terms of
changing stationery and signage and in terms of reestablishing
the consumer's association between the user's business and the
new mark. Thus, the problem identified in the earliest cases
still besets this area of trademark law. No matter which analy-
sis is used, statutory or common law, both consumers and busi-
nesses frequently are losers when concurrent use exists.
VI. REFORMING THE STATUTE
A. The Case for a Single User
In the preceding sections we have seen that the current law
is often difficult to apply and creates numerous opportunities
both for consumer confusion and poor business planning. The
difficult task now is to find a solution to those problems with-
out creating other unintended consequences.
When we look at the evolution of the law, three things stand
out. First, the concurrent use doctrine is based on a sense that
a junior user should not be deprived of goodwill earned in good
faith. Second, the doctrine's common law origins also reflect a
residual belief that the courts lack the power to create a na-
tionwide solution from a patchwork of state laws. Third, the
Lanham Act is a somewhat schizophrenic attempt to mollify the
first problem while alleviating the second. It adopts the basic
structure of the common law doctrine, but adds constructive
notice and constructive use provisions giving a national senior
user who is a registrant the ability to cut off the ability of a
203. Trademarks in the Marketplace, 53 TRADEMARK REP. 687, 696-97 (1963). See
also Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, SJ.A, 979 F.2d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1992) (company
paid a federal registrant $125,000 for a covenant not to sue for use of the mark on
wholly unrelated goods).
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junior user to claim that its goodwill was earned in good
faith.' 4 Because it is a federal statute, the Lanham Act can
impose nationwide uniformity, regardless of any state laws.
However, as we have seen, the complete common law structure
comes into the Lanham Act for unregistered marks through
section 43(a). In those cases, the courts have not chosen to
impose a separate federal law, but have adopted existing com-
mon law doctrine. This leaves even the Lanham Act with an
inherent nonuniformity. Furthermore, even those cases involv-
ing registered marks" do not solve the consumer confusion and
business planning problems satisfactorily. The Lanham Act
continues to allow concurrent use of a mark, even where confu-
sion is inevitable."5 In an economy that is now far more na-
tionally integrated than it was in 1918 (or 1946), this
balkanized system is undesirable.. Furthermore, the great poten-
tial for consumer confusion points to a single user solution as
the best way to prevent confusion and to promote rational busi-
ness planning.
An appropriate solution should accomplish two things. First,
it should account for the equities on both sides of the litigation.
The trademark registrant, assuming one party is a registrant,
followed proper procedures and should be rewarded for having
done so. But the non-registrant who uses the same mark in
good faith should be compensated for the good will it has
earned.
Second, the solution should alleviate the consumer confusion
problem left by Hoots and Dawn Donut. Courts have struggled
a bit with this problem under existing law. In some cases, they
have forced one side or the other to put disclaimers in adver-
tisements, or to cease advertising in certain areas. This is not a
satisfactory solution. Disclaimers may be misunderstood, or not
even seen by consumers.206 Prohibiting a legitimate registrant
204. Indeed, the more recent amendments, permitting intent to use applications,
cut off rights even earlier. Applying the constructive use provision, an intent to use
applicant cuts off all junior users except someone who began using the mark prior to
the registration application (in which case the applicant could not be the actual se-
nior user).
205. The Dawn Donut rule is perhaps the most egregious example of this problem.
206. For example, a traveler from Texas would not be likely to have seen a
disclaimer concerning the Matoon, Illinois, Burger King's lack of affiliation with the
national claim. Yet this traveler could be confused if he or she ever went to Matoon
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from advertising in certain areas seems unfair; it limits the
registrant's ability to use the mark to attract new customers.
Even when the parties are both very remote the best solution
is to permit only one user of the mark on particular goods. It is
difficult to predict that one will stay permanently in one loca-
tion. It changes the potential market value of the firm as a
whole when one has to account for the limited scope of its
trademark rights. The simplest scheme would permit the na-
tional senior user to enjoin any junior user, even a remote one,
in any case where confusion would be likely assuming that the
parties were not remote. However, that solution fails to meet
the objection that spawned the "Tea Rose" doctrine: the remote
junior user should not be deprived of goodwill earned in good
faith."7 The obvious solution is some kind of reimbursement
to the junior user for this goodwill. If the junior user is appro-
priately compensated, then it seems less unfair to force a sale
of the junior user's rights in the mark. Because the senior user
will benefit, it is also only fair to make the senior user pay for
those rights, not the government. Thus, an appropriate solution
would be some sort of forced buyout by one party of the other.
Probably the major objection to this solution is that a forced
sale favors larger users over small users. A related objection is
that such a system favors "rational" economic values over the
"irrational" desire of a company to do business under a particu-
lar name. Both of these arguments have considerable merit, but
neither should ultimately prevent the creation of a reasonable
buyout system.
and ate at a Burger King restaurant. Even if the Matoon Burger King were forced to
put a disclaimer on its menus or placemats, that may not be an effective remedy
because the potential customer will already be inside before the disclaimer is seen.
See National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enters., 327 N.E.2d 242,
247 (Ill. App. 1975) (expressing doubt about the value of disclaimers), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See generally Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf,
Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than They Are
Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35 (1986); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy
for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59
(1986).
207. To some degree, § 7(c) will do just that. A 'junior" user whose first use post-
dates application for registration may even be the actual senior user (if the applica-
tion is based on intent to use), but the junior user's priority will be stripped by the
constructive use provision.
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In theory at least, a sale at fair market value should not
favor one party over another. As will be seen, the buyout sys-
tem to be proposed includes a court supervised valuation pro-
cess. That should help minimize bargaining advantages. There
are other means of ameliorating advantages of larger parties;
they will be discussed more fully below. It is hard to know how
to respond to the second objection. The law frequently overrides
"irrational" desires where necessary to achieve larger objectives.
A well known contracts case, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,"8
is an example of the law overriding an individual's desires. The
plaintiff contracted to build a house for defendant. The contract
specified that a particular brand of pipe was to be used. The
plaintiff used a different, but equivalent, brand of pipe in the
construction. Rather than force the plaintiff to rip out the
incorrect pipe and substitute the specified pipe the court found
that the substitution caused little if any damage to the
defendant and therefore defendant could not recover the cost of
substituting pipe.29 Trademark law is not immune to this sort
of result. For example, the average person no doubt would be
surprised to learn that one's name is not always capable of
being used as the mark for one's business. But trademark law
clearly allows a court to enjoin a person from using his or her
name in a business when necessary to protect the rights of
senior users of the mark and to prevent confusion.21° Thus,
although the law is not immune to appeals to personal
"irrational" tastes, personal desires will not always overcome
the need to achieve larger objectives. In this case, the junior
user may like the mark and sincerely wish to continue its oth-
erwise good faith use of that mark. However, that reasonable
desire must give way to the larger needs of consistency and
avoidance of consumer confusion. On the other hand, it is rea-
sonable for the seller to be fairly compensated for relinquishing
its rights in the mark.
208. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
209. Id. at 891. But see Gory Associated Indus. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal,
Inc., 358 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (granting recovery where the contrac-
tor painted the roof the wrong color).
210. See, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 94 (1914);
Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1978).
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The idea of a buyout in the concurrent use situation is not
altogether new; it was even mentioned in passing during the
hearings leading to the Lanham Act.2 ' The fact that it has
not been attempted most likely reflects both political obstacles
and various practical problems that this article attempts to
solve.
B. The Buyout System
Proposing a mandatory buyout system requires one to re-
spond to several questions. How will the system operate? How
does one force a buyout? Does each party have an equal right
to buy out the other? If it is not a negotiated buyout between
the parties, who will decide on a price, how will that person be
appointed and what factors are relevant to the decision? What
procedures will exist to ensure fairness to both sides? This
section will attempt to answer these questions.
To answer the first two questions we must generate a propos-
al. We will assume that the buyout scheme is to be embodied
in amendments to the federal trademark law. The general
structure of the proposed buyout system will be as follows. One
party will file a suit in a federal court. The court will make a
preliminary determination whether the suit involves infringe-
ment, for which defendant will be enjoined, or whether the
defendant has some territorial rights in the trademark. If the
latter, the court will give the parties a choice of three alterna-
tives: (1) permit concurrent use under existing law; (2) negoti-
ate a purchase of the mark by one party; and (3) conduct a
proceeding in which one party will be given the right to buy
out the other's rights at a price set by a court-appointed arbi-
trator.
This simple structure masks a number of issues. First, a cost
issue arises, because it adds a new layer of court-annexed deci-
sion making. Second, this structure requires filling in a number
of details before it can be intelligently discussed. Because
211. RICHARD F. DOLE, JR., TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 25 n.114 (1965) (citing Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the
House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1941) (remarks of Louis Rob-
ertson). These remarks were not pursued by the members of the committee.
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parties' expectations differ depending on whether there is a
registered mark, the details will be discussed in separate sec-
tions below.
For now, I will address one critical issue that affects the
system in general. That issue is where the action should begin.
I submit that federal courts should be given exclusive jurisdic-
tion over these cases and that all buyout arbitrations be carried
out under the auspices of federal courts. Requiring federal juris-
diction will inject more uniformity into the system. It will also
make it simpler to locate cases geographically because the fed-
eral courts clearly can be given sufficient personal jurisdiction
to force all relevant parties to litigate in one forum.212 More-
over, if states had concurrent jurisdiction they would have to
shoulder the added costs of the buyout system. Undoubtedly,
Congress would not make adequate provisions for reimbursing
those expenditures. It seems unfair to impose those costs on the
states when the purpose is to foster a consistent, nationwide
system.
We will begin by discussing certain threshold issues, com-
mencing the proceeding and choosing the buyer.
1. Commencing the Proceeding
Devising a procedure for commencing this process is trickier
than it might appear. Before a court can send the parties to a
valuation proceeding a determination must be made that the
case is an appropriate one for such a proceeding. The buyout
process envisioned here is intended for the situation in which
two parties have the right to use the same or similar marks on
goods or services in different geographic locations. 13 It is not
212. This would cover the circumstance where there are more than two users of
the mark, but where only two are initially involved in the suit. If there were a na-
tionwide service of process provision with state courts having concurrent jurisdiction,
state courts most likely would be bound to follow it. However, such a provision would
raise some questions that ultimately would have to be resolved by the courts and, in
any event, states are less familiar with nationwide service issues than are federal
courts. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in
Personal Jurisdiction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 49-51 (1987); see generally David
Carlebach, Nationwide Service of Process in State Courts, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 223
(1991).
213. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959)
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intended to be used in an ordinary infringement situation
where one user has superior rights to the mark. But the line
between the two in a given case may not be clear. Thus, a
preliminary determination that the case is a proper one for the
valuation proceeding is necessary.
A further difficulty arises when the initial infringement ac-
tion is brought in state court under the common law or some
applicable state law. 14 Because it is difficult to know in ad-
vance whether a specific case will be a viable one for a buyout
valuation, it must be one where a concurrent use is permitted;
a provision requiring immediate removal to federal court of any
concurrent use case is unrealistic. Such immediate removal
would require unnecessary federal court decisions in cases
where ordinary infringement exists, no concurrent use is per-
mitted, and an injunction is appropriate. Therefore, the decision
concerning any buyout should wait until the state court makes
a finding that a concurrent use is permitted. At that point, the
appropriate party should be permitted to enforce the buyout
mechanism by initiating a proceeding in federal court, or re-
moving the pending action from state court, to enforce the buy-
out mechanism.215
Naturally, this will not be as simple a process as with a
registered mark, or even a section 43(a) claim. It will require
two courts to pass on the issue, which may ruffle a few feath-
ers among the state court judges. The law will have to provide
(the junior user's right to use the mark is subject to divestiture whenever the regis-
tered senior user chooses to enter the junior user's territory).
214. If brought under federal law, most such cases would be removed. One might
think that cases brought in state court under state law would not involve interstate
commerce. However, it would be a rare case that does not at least "affect" such com-
merce. Thus, federal law could apply in such cases. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) ("affecting commerce" standard); Larry
Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Restaurant Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 666 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (Lanham Act reaches all commerce that Congress may regulate).
215. One might contemplate a system in which the states are forced to provide
arbitrators in any case where a valuation proceeding is permitted by federal law.
However, that would unfairly impose significant costs, both financial and administra-
tive, on the states to solve a national problem. Moreover, it might be an unconstitu-
tional infringement on state authority to force the states to adopt this procedure. See
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (provisions of Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act forcing states to take title to waste or regulate in accordance
with congressional instructions violates Tenth Amendment).
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that the federal court may override state court orders as nec-
essary to implement the buyout system.216 But the law should
also force the federal courts to accept certain factual findings of
the state court. The federal court must accept the state court's
findings as to the legitimacy of concurrent use.217 It must ac-
cept the findings as to the extent of the permissible use by
either side. These may have important consequences in the
valuation process. 8
Once the court determines that the two parties have concur-
rent rights to the mark, a valuation proceeding may be request-
ed. The next question, then, is who may request such a pro-
ceeding?
2. Choosing the Buyer: The Registered Mark
A registered mark carries with it certain rights and expecta-
tions. This is particularly true of a registered user whose right
to use the mark is incontestable. The Lanham Act provides that
incontestable marks are conclusive evidence of the registrant's
exclusive right to use the mark nationwide, subject to only a
few defenses (one of them being the limited area defense of a
prior user discussed above).2"9 These rights and expectations
are an important incentive for trademark owners and potential
216. This will avoid any problem with the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1983). That law generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceed-
ings. The provisions of that law may be overridden by express exceptions in other
federal statutes.
217. Or conversely, the federal court must accept any state court finding of confu-
sion and, if necessary, dismiss the buyout action.
218. There is a potential difficulty with this system. If a claim is brought in state
court under state law there may be a temptation on the part of the state judge sim-
ply to find a concurrent use situation and pass the remedial stage, the buyout, off to
the federal courts. This is an unlikely occurrence, however. One should assume that
state judges are honest and will not pass their responsibilities on to the federal
courts. More important is the fact that there are few advantages to state judges
being lax. If they find concurrent use they still must make a determination of the
geographic scope of any lawful concurrent use, which is not a particularly easy task.
Perhaps the more dangerous possibility is that state judges will favor a local party
with a larger than justified geographic area of protection to enhance that party's posi-
tion in the buyout. But if the case is in state court, both parties are likely to be
from the same state, which limits the possibility of bias. In most other situations the
case more than likely would end up in federal court on diversity grounds if not under
the federal trademark laws.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
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owners to seek registration of their marks. A registered user
ought to be able to count on keeping the registration, even if
someone else could make "better" use of the mark. Therefore,
the buyout system should grant the registered user the pre-
sumptive right to purchase the mark of the unregistered user.
This means that in a dispute between a registrant and a non-
registrant, the registrant will have standing to initiate a valua-
tion proceeding.
Naturally, not all registered users will want this priority. In
some cases the registrant will be unable to fund a purchase,
particularly if the unregistered user's territory is large. The
system should provide two alternatives for dealing with that
problem. First, it should provide that the purchase price may
be paid over time (five years, for example) with some interest
rate to be set by the arbitrator. That may permit some regis-
trants to finance the purchase. Alternatively, the registrant
should be entitled to refuse to buy out220 the non-registrant
and be content with the existence of a concurrent user.
This latter alternative raises two questions: (1) Can the non-
registrant now buy out the registrant? (2) Can the registrant
later return to court and force a buyout? As to the first ques-
tion, the answer is no, unless the registrant consents to a buy-
out by the non-registrant. A registrant should not be forced to
relinquish its rights. Admittedly, this leaves open the likelihood
of some consumer confusion. However, the countervailing expec-
tation of a registrant is that its rights will not have to yield to
a non-registrant except in exceptional circumstances.22' More-
over, granting this preemptive right to registrants prevents
smaller registrants from being taken over by larger non-regis-
trants who chose not to use the national registration system. In
essence, we are rewarding the registrant for availing itself of
the registration system. On the other hand, if the registrant
220. Such a refusal could be manifested by a failure to initiate a valuation pro-
ceeding. This would prevent the non-registrant from forcing the issue. Another form
of refusal would come after the proceeding, once a value is placed on the non-
registrants mark. Because of the potential unfairness this latter refusal may cause,
this right of refusal would not be without restrictions.
221. One could argue that changing the law will change those expectations. That
would be true for future registrants, but existing registrants would not have antici-
pated such a change.
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does not object, the parties may see the valuation procedure as
a useful mechanism to place an appropriate value on the regis-
trant's trademark. If so, they should be permitted to use it.222
As to the second question, the answer is yes, it should be
possible for the registrant to return later and force a buyout.
This will help solve the consumer confusion problem that would
otherwise exist. However, to avoid unfairness to the non-regis-
trant, there should be two conditions placed on a second valua-
tion proceeding. The first condition should be to require the
registrant to have an incontestable mark before returning to
court. This protects the marks most worthy of our indulgence.
The second condition should be to require the registrant to pay
the non-registrant's reasonable attorneys fees in the second
proceeding for the privilege of being allowed to force a second
proceeding. This assures that the non-registrant is not unfairly
burdened with added costs as a way of giving the registrant
leverage in the buyout process.
The reason I choose to augment rather than supplant the
present system is to protect smaller registrant-plaintiffs. Some
litigants may prefer allowing the non-registrant a limited
sphere of operation as opposed to a payment. Furthermore,
because the registrant would not be forced to initiate a proceed-
ing within a certain time after discovering the concurrent use, a
non-registrant may have some incentive to settle early on rea-
sonable terms rather than risk the uncertainty of a buyout at a
time not under its control. At the same time, one would expect
that a registrant who waits to exercise the buyout option might
face a larger payment because the non-registrant has been
induced to believe that its investment in the mark may
continue.'
222. Admittedly, this encourages the use of the court system to promote a largely
private transaction. However, there are countervailing factors. First, the transaction
will result in a single user of the mark, which benefits the public. Second, at least
some of the cost of the system will be borne by the parties, who must pay for the
person appointed to evaluate the mark.
223. This right should be subject to some sort of laches notion, to the extent that
the non-registrant is led to believe there will never be a buyout. But this should be a
limited defense. A registrant might sell its business, and the mark, to a third party,
who wants to exploit the mark more extensively. That could lead to confusion if con-
current users exist.
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The idea of the registrant buying out the non-registered user
returns trademark law somewhat to the goal of protection of
consumers as opposed to the protection of traders in the mar-
ketplace. It recognizes that, while it is appropriate to accord
some value to the good faith remote user of the mark, we
should not protect the trader at the expense of the consumer,
who may use trademarks as indicia of levels of quality. More-
over, by requiring the registrant to pay fair value for the right
to have a monopoly on the mark, we honor the free market
principles of competition supposedly underlying our regulation
of unfair competition. The competitors are protected by fair
compensation for their investment in a mark, ensuring that
they can continue as competitors. At the same time, consumers
receive a consistent message from brand name advertising of a
particular product and can rightfully attribute the appropriate
level of trust, high or low, in the name used to advertise a par-
ticular product.
For the Dawn Donut224 situation, where there exists a ju-
nior user whose use postdates registration, a registrant should
be offered the following: it may accept the current state of the
law and allow the defendant to continue to operate until the
registrant enters the territory or it may immediately buy out
the non-registrant at a price determined either by the parties
or by an arbitrator.2' Naturally, because the non-registrant
has constructive notice of registration,- the price should reflect
this as well as the fact that the registrant can cut off the non-
registrant's rights simply by bona fide entry into the local mar-
ket. On the other hand, if the non-registrant's entry into the
market was not in good faith, if the non-registrant had actual,
in addition to constructive, notice of the plaintiffs prior use of
the mark, then no buyout should be required and the registrant
should be entitled to an immediate injunction, regardless of
whether the registrant is presently trading in the same area.
224. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 358 (2d Cir.
1959).
225. This assumes that Congress would not choose to change the law affecting this
situation. I would prefer that the law be amended to permit injunctions in the Dawn
Donut circumstance. However, the buyout at least gives the still-remote registrant the
means to oust the junior user immediately.
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3. Choosing the Buyer: Concurrent Registration
The one situation in which a registrant should not be able to
count on keeping the registration occurs where there are con-
current registrations under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act." 6
If the Lanham Act is amended to eliminate or restrict concur-
rent uses of trademarks, concurrent registrations should never
issue without the consent of the parties. Instead, one party
should be permitted to buy out the other. There should be very
few new concurrent registrations issued by the PTO. Moreover,
concurrent registration should rarely issue as a consequence of
litigation. Under the new system, when a lawful concurrent use
is found, the registrant may buy the rights in the mark from
the non-registrant. That should eliminate most concurrent regis-
trations.
Thus, the future situations in which concurrent registrations
are issued should be rare. However, that does not solve the
problem of existing concurrent registrations. In those instances,
the new system should attempt to eliminate concurrent uses by
permitting one registrant to buy out the other. But which regis-
trant should have priority? Allowing priority to the registrant
that first filed for registration admittedly is an arbitrary system
(and one that is rejected in the next section where there are no
registrants). However, there are some ways of ameliorating,
though not eliminating, potential unfairness.
Either registrant should be permitted to initiate a valuation
proceeding by filing and serving the appropriate papers. If the
initiating party is not the one to apply for registration first,
then the "defendant" should have a short period of time (thirty
days, for example) to file and serve a cross petition for valua-
tion. That would preserve its priority. However, to prevent bad
faith cross petitions filed simply to forestall a buyout by the
other side, perhaps a penalty should be imposed if the cross-
petitioner fails to consummate the buyout.
The court should also have the discretion to allow a cross
petition by the second registrant, even if that registrant does
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
370 [Vol. 28:315
CONCURRENT USE OF TRADEMARKS
not have the buyout priority. It may be that holding one pro-
ceeding will be more economical in the event the original peti-
tioner fails to consummate the purchase.
4. Choosing the Buyer: Neither Party Registered-Common
Law and Section 43(a) Claims
If neither party is registered, then the problem of choosing
which party has the first right to buy out the other becomes
more complicated. Under common law doctrine, neither user
has a claim to nationwide priority. The national senior user has
priority only in its area and in the areas in which its mark has
a reputation (and perhaps in its "zone of natural expansion").
The junior user has priority in those areas in which it was the
first to use the mark. Thus, there is no obvious basis on which
to choose the buyer in a buyout system. Nevertheless, if a buy-
out scheme is to work well, it should cover unregistered marks
as well as registered ones.
One possible method of selecting the priority buyer would be
to permit the parties to attempt to register their marks. The
first to register would obtain the initial purchasing rights
through the system described previously. However, such a race
to register creates a purely artificial means of making the deci-
sion. It overwhelmingly favors the more sophisticated party,
who can obtain legal advice on the need to race to register and
can finish the necessary paperwork needed to register. Further-
more, it puts additional strain on the PTO, which would have
to decide registration issues solely for the purpose of determin-
ing the buyout "winner."
Ideally, one probably would want to favor the party that
could make the best use of the mark. Unfortunately, that is not
so easily determined. For one thing, it is not clear what the
"best" use would mean. Would it be the most widespread use of
the mark? Would it be the use on the highest quality product?
Would it be the use most likely to benefit the economy, assum-
ing that could be measured?
One solution to this problem is to give the first user in the
United States the right of priority in the buyout decision. Un-
der this solution, the national senior user would have the right
to buy out the junior user's rights in the mark if it so chooses.
19941
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If the senior user waives the right, then the junior user would
have a buyout right. This is a bit different from the registered
mark situation, where only the registrant has a right to pur-
chase. However, in that situation the registrant has a right to
expect that its federal registration affords protection against a
mandatory sale of the mark. In the case of two non-registered
parties, neither party has a right to make such an assumption.
One difficulty with this scheme is that the senior user may
assert a right to purchase, only to find that the purchase price
is too expensive. This would waste precious time and money.
Even though a waiver at that point would enable the junior
user to proceed with a buyout, the proceedings to that point
would have focused on the value of the junior user's mark;
thus, a new proceeding, with its attendant costs, would have to
be commenced. One way to avoid that problem would be to
have the proceedings determine the value on both sides at the
same time. The efficacy' of this solution would depend on the
complexity of the valuation process."2 A better solution would
be to defer the commencement of unrealistic valuation proceed-
ings. That could be accomplished by requiring a party which
initiates a buyout but fails to consummate the purchase to pay
the reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the other
side during the valuation process. That could become a rather
harsh sanction should the proceedings become complex and may
even give the opposing party reason to drag out the proceedings
to raise the ante. If, however, we limit the award of full
attorneys' fees to the circumstance when the other party initi-
ates a second proceeding and consummates a purchase, it will
deter unwarranted actions, but only where the other side is
prepared to go forward with a purchase."2 ' In other cases, the
court should have the discretion to force the non-buying party
to pay all of the fees of the arbitrator.
227. See infra part VI.B.6.
228. As a balancing factor, if the junior user initiates a second proceeding and
fails to consummate a purchase, attorneys' fees could be awarded to the senior user.
That would prevent the junior user from getting an unfair advantage. After all, the
first proceeding should give the junior user some insight into the value of the senior
user's mark, even though that is not its primary purpose. Thus the junior user is in
a better position to decide whether or not to initiate its own buyout proceeding than
was the senior user when it made the same decision.
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Another issue is whether the senior user is the only person
with standing to initiate a valuation proceeding. The answer is
no. As with concurrent registrants, either side should be able to
initiate the proceeding. However, if the junior user is the initia-
tor, then the senior user should have thirty days to cross peti-
tion and assert its superior right to a buyout. Again, as with
concurrent registrants, a penalty should be imposed if a senior
user-cross petitioner does not consummate the buyout.
5. The Arbitrator-Appointment and Powers
Once there is a determination of lawful concurrent use and,
if necessary, removal to a federal court, the party with the
right of buyout will petition the court for the appointment of an
arbitrator for valuation. Before the arbitrator is appointed, the
court should direct that the parties negotiate for thirty days.
This would avoid the expense of further proceedings where the
parties can reach a negotiated buyout price. Moreover, the ne-
gotiations will be conducted against a background of the im-
pending process of valuation. Thus, the parties will be aware
that, should they fail, they will have to bear the risks of the
buyout procedure. Once the process has been in place for some
time, the existence of reported results may enable the parties to
estimate with reasonable accuracy the likely outcome of such a
proceeding and negotiate a suitable price for themselves.
Once the negotiation period expires, the court should appoint
the arbitrator. The appointment process may be modeled after
that used under Federal Rule 53229 for the appointment of
special masters. However, the arbitrator appointed under the
law should not be a special master; rather, he or she should
have the usual powers of an arbitrator, subject to the limited
court review afforded in arbitration proceedings. This procedure
has two major advantages. First, it will avoid many questions
about a right to a jury trial in the valuation proceeding.2 30
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
230. The Supreme Court has upheld statutory schemes which give factfinding and
even enforcement authority to specialized tribunals. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460 (1977); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). But cf Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 49, 61 (1987) (suit by bankruptcy trustee in bankruptcy court
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Second, by streamlining both trial and review, this procedure
will reduce the overall cost of the proceedings to the litigants.
There are several sources from which to choose an arbitrator.
One possibility is the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice, another is the American Arbitration Association. Each
party could submit a list of names for the court, and failing any
agreement, the court would appoint someone from one of the
listed names or from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. Obviously, the arbitrator should have experience with
business valuation. However, the possibilities of conflict of in-
terest may eliminate certain people, such as many investment
bankers, from consideration.
In other respects, the provisions for special masters provide a
useful model for certain actions of the arbitrator. The arbitrator
should be required to file a reportY As discussed previously,
creating a body of reasoned valuation precedent is an important
mechanism in the valuation system. It promotes a certain level
of consistency of awards, and it allows for the development of a
comprehensive, though perhaps evolving, set of standards for
valuation, without the need for a costly administrative agency
or for intense congressional oversight. A written report contain-
ing the arbitrator's rationale for decision is critical to develop-
ing appropriate valuation standards.
There is some precedent for an arbitration scheme like the
one presented here. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 2 pesticide manufacturers who
request that the Environmental Protection Agency use data
submitted by other parties in connection with other pesticide
registrations to support their own pesticide registrations"3
may be forced to arbitration by the original registrant. The
purpose of this arbitration is to compensate the original regis-
trant for the use of its data by another company. FIFRA sets
forth procedures by which the parties may invoke binding arbi-
tration through an arbitrator appointed by the Federal Media-
to avoid fraudulent transfers is subject to right of trial by jury).
231. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(1).
232. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-w (1992).
233. These subsequent users are known as "follow on" or "me too" registrants.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 572 (1985).
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tion and Conciliation ServiceY 4 The arbitration scheme set
forth here is much like that in FIFRA, with two significant
exceptions. First, under FIFRA, the arbitrator is not appointed
by the court. Second, under the trademark buyout procedure I
have proposed, cases may be removed from state to federal
court to allow for the appointment of the arbitrator.
It is possible to raise at least two significant constitutional
objections to this scheme. First, one might claim that the bind-
ing arbitration procedure violates the litigants' rights to be
heard by a federal court created under Article III of the Consti-
tution, one whose judges have salary protection and life ten-
ureY5 Second, the user whose mark is being purchased may
allege that it is a forced taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Article III objection was raised, and rejected, as to the
FIFRA scheme in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod-
ucts Co. 6 However, the differences between the trademark
buyout and the FIFRA arbitration scheme merit a closer look at
this subject. In Thomas, the Court noted that "the FIFRA arbi-
tration scheme incorporates its own system of internal sanctions
and relies only tangentially, if at all, on the Judicial Branch for
enforcement." 7 By contrast, the proposed procedure relies
more heavily on the federal courts by making them the appoint-
ing authority and by providing for removal of cases from state
courts. On the other hand, the trademark arbitration scheme
shares certain attributes with the FIFRA scheme that the
Court found significant in Thomas. First, the process "serves a
public purpose""8 by lessening the chances of consumer confu-
sion in the marketplace resulting from concurrent use of a
trademark.
Second, the Thomas Court, citing Crowell v. Benson, 9 not-
ed that "when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of re-
solving matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the
234. FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(O)(ii) (1988).
235. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
236. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
237. Id. at 591.
238. Id. at 589.
239. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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Executive and Legislative Branches,' the danger of encroaching
on the judicial powers is reduced."24° Congress could simply
overhaul the trademark regulation scheme and eliminate con-
current use altogether. Thus, under the reasoning of Thomas,
Congress should be able to take the lesser step of resolving the
issue through this arbitration scheme.
Finally, it should be noted that although there is limited
review of an arbitrator's ruling, there would be some opportuni-
ty for review by an Article III court. Furthermore, this process
involves a very limited area of federal law and not a traditional
common law claim.24 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court
would find this procedure to be invalid under Article III.
A claim that this scheme is a taking without just compensa-
tion also should fail. We may assume, arguendo, that a forced
buyout of common law or statutory trademark rights constitutes
a taking of property.12 It is clear that any such taking would
be for a public purpose. Although the immediate effect of a
buyout is to benefit a private party, eliminating potential con-
sumer confusion stemming from concurrent use constitutes a
public purpose."3 The only remaining question is whether the
seller is justly compensated. The arbitration system proposed
here is intended to provide a professional evaluation of the
worth of the seller's mark. Absent a complete failure on that
score there is no reason to assume that the amount paid will
not be "1just."244
240. Thomas, 473 U.S. At 589 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50)). Crowell dis-
cussed an arbitration system for certain types of workers compensation actions by
longshore and harbor workers. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 25.
241. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54
(1986) (upholding the right of the CFTC to hear counterclaims for brokerage account
debt in proceeding brought by client claiming wrongdoing by the broker).
242. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (holding that
intangible property rights embodied in trade secrets constitute "property" under the
Takings Clause).
243. See id. at 1014-16 (explaining that Congress could rationally believe that
permitting later pesticide registrants to use data submitted by prior registrants pro-
moted the public good); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984)
(stating that the legislature's power to take property for "public use" is "coterminous"
with its police power; the taking need only be "rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose").
244. See infra part VI.B.6 (describing two valuation methodologies which adapt
conventional business valuation techniques for this purpose).
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6. The Valuation Methodology
Perhaps the most difficult problem with an arbitrated buyout
scheme is the valuation of the trademarks. Trademark law
presents some unique roadblocks to an accurate determination
of the value of this asset. It is not the intent of this article to
set forth a comprehensive set of valuation standards. Indeed, it
is anticipated that some of the specific standards will evolve as
the process is used. However, it is necessary to demonstrate
that a set of valuation standards can be established in order for
the procedure to work. This section will discuss briefly some
proposed methodologies for trademark valuation. In addition,
this section will try to identify some of the factors that may be
weighed in the process.
A trademark is an intangible asset. Its value is primarily
dependent on the public's reaction to it. Moreover, a trademark
cannot be bought and sold like any other asset. Conventional
trademark law prohibits what is called an assignment "in
gross;" that is, a sale of a trademark divorced from the underly-
ing good will of the business. 5 Thus, there is no such thing
as an abstract sale of a trademark on the open market from
which one might extrapolate a value for other marks. Further-
more, a trademark's value either will not appear at all as an
asset or, if it was purchased with the good will of a business, it
will only be stated at book value.246 As a result, there is little
incentive for businesses to create a systematic method for valu-
ing trademarks.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1991 & Supp. 1993); Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d
285, 287-88 (8th Cir. 1969); Sands, Taylor and Wood. Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978
F.2d 947, 956 (7th Cir. 1992); Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp.
137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The law does allow, however, substantial leeway in licens-
ing trademarks, as long as the trademark owner retains some quality control over the
uses made of the mark by the licensee. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1991 & Supp.
1993) (permitting use of the mark by "related companies," defined as those over
which the owner of the mark exerts quality control). Moreover, one can contractually
agree not to sue another person for trademark infringement, while retaining all other
rights. See Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S., 979 F.2d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that one party had purchased such an agreement for $125,000).
246. Alexandra Ourusoff, et al., What's In a Name? What the World's Top Brands
are Worth, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 1, 1992, at 40 [hereinafter What's In a Name].
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If there were no reasonable method available to evaluate the
worth of a mark, then even having a knowledgeable arbitrator,
or Congress create such a method would be a formidable task.
However, there are some guidelines available. Though outright
sales of a trademark in gross cannot exist, a trademark can be
licensed.247 Many famous marks are licensed for uses far re-
moved from the goods and services with which they are primar-
ily associated.248 Such licensing anticipates that there will be
an income stream generated by the use of the mark. This could
form the basis of a valuation methodology.
However, the difficulty in placing a value on a trademark
should not be underestimated. Because there is no true "mar-
ket" for the purchase and sale of marks there is no direct way
to measure this value. Moreover, even when a business, whose
most important assets are brand names, is sold, the cost of the
trademarks would not be separated from the cost of the rest of
the business. 9 If the business has not been sold, calculating
the "cost" of creating the -mark by using advertising expenses,
for instance, would be almost impossible. The expenses involved
in creating a mark may bear little relationship to the current
value of the mark."0 Thus, one must devise other strategies
for valuing trademarks.
There has been a flurry of interest recently in trademark
valuation."' Some companies are interested in making trade-
marks explicit assets on their balance sheets.252 Others would
247. 15 U.S.C. § 1055.
248. See generally Robert Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of
the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984).
249. See, e.g., Michael Renshall, Accounting for Brands-The Practitioner's Perspec-
tive, in BRAND VALUATION 49, 50-51 (John Murphy ed., 2d ed. 1991); David Nash,
Accounting for Brands-An Industry Perspective, in BRAND VALUATION 67 (John Mur-
phy ed., 2d ed. 1991); Edward Buchan & Alastair Brown, Brand Valuation and Its
Role in Mergers and Acquisitions, in BRAND VALUATION 76 (John Murphy ed., 2d ed.
1991).
250. Michael Birkin, Valuation of Trade Marks and Brand Names, in BRAND VAU-
ATION 35 (John Murphy ed., 2d ed. 1991).
251. See generally BRAND VALUATION, supra note 250; GORDON V. SMITH & Rus-
SELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS (1993)
[hereinafter SMITH & PARR]; GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter SMITH &
PARR SUPP.]; Ourusoff, supra note 246.
252. See, e.g., SMITH & PARR SUPP., supra note 252, at 3-26; Renshall, supra note
249, at 54-63.
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like to use such values as a means of evaluating the true worth
of a potential purchase or takeover. Obviously, this requires the
development of systematic valuation techniques. At least two
such techniques have been published recently. They are dis-
cussed here not as shining models for future evaluations but to
illustrate the fact that one need not begin from ground zero to
create a valuation methodology.
253
One method, put forth by a British entity, the Interbrand
Group, is described as "an earnings multiple system."25
4
Essentially, this method seeks to determine the earnings of a
business that are attributable to the trademark and then to
apply an appropriate multiplier to those earnings to arrive at a
brand or trademark valueY5 This requires one to calculate,
among other things, what the company earnings would be with-
out the brand, what portion of profitability is due to other as-
sets (such as efficient distribution systems) and an appropriate
multiplier. 6 Calculating the appropriate multiplier is a fairly
complex matter, involving several factors. 7 The weighting for
these factors also appears to be somewhat subjective and not
easily quantifiableY
The authors of a recent article in a financial magazine have
attempted to use a modified form of the Interbrand methodolo-
gy to place a value on specific trademarks.2 9 That process in-
volved determining the value of sales of trademarked goods,
determining operating margins of the business and then sub-
tracting the "generic" value of the product.26 For some
253. It may be useful for Congress or the PTO to give general guidelines for valu-
ation to avoid the very disparate results illustrated by these two methods.
254. Birken, supra note 250, at 36.
255. Id. at 36.
256. Id. at 36-39. This description is a simplification of the process described by
the author. My purpose is not to give an exhaustive account of the methodology, but
to outline certain factors and difficulties associated with the system. I leave to others
the task of a detailed evaluation of the possible valuation methodologies.
257. Id. at 39-44. The factors listed were leadership, stability, market in which
product competes, internationality, trend, support (whether there is "investment and
focused support" by the owner), protection (registered or not, other legal protection,
etc.). Id. at 39-41.
258. See id. at 41-44. The author is at least aware of the fact that the overall
value is highly dependent on certain key factors. See id. at 45-46.
259. Ourusoff, supra note 246, at 34.
260. Id.
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brands, the authors used a method based on the licensing value
of the corporate name. This was deemed especially useful for
corporate marks like Gillette, whose marks do not adorn just
one product, but which are used on a variety of goods."' In
addition, the process used a multiplier based on the perceived
strength of the brand name.262 These calculations resulted in
very large values for several well-known trademarks.2"
A recent book takes a different route to trademark valuation.
In this second model, the authors use a process called "disag-
gregation" to arrive at a value for a trademark.2 Briefly stat-
ed, this method involves determining the total value of the
business (which may be determined by the fair market value of
its shares plus long term debt265 or by capitalizing the com-
pany's cash flow266) and then subtracting either values that
can be attributed to parts of the company other than trade-
marks, such as the value of tangible assets (e.g., plant and
equipment) or the net book value of the company."' The re-
mainder is the value of intangible assets. From that remainder
may be subtracted the value of other intangible assets, such as
a talented work force268, leaving the value of the trade-
mark.2"9 This method may also be expressed as an income
capitalization. One determines the total return on assets of the
business, subtracts the return attributable to identifiable assets,
leaving the income attributable to the mark.7 This income is
capitalized to produce the trademark value. 71
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 48. The Coca-Cola mark, for example, was determined to be worth over
$24 billion. Id.
264. SMITH & PARR, supra note 252, at 275-84; SMITH & PARR SUPP., supra note
252, at 8-10.
265. SMITH & PARR, supra note 251, at 276-78.
266. Id. at 278-82.
267. Id. at 282-83.
268. Id. at 283.
269. This assumes that the company has only one trademark. If it has more than
one mark, or more than one area of business, this analysis must be narrowed to the
segment of the business attributable to this mark. See SMITH & PARR SUPP, supra
note 251, at 8-10.
270. Id. at 11, Fig. 3A.4.
271. Id. Naturally, the necessary rate of return attributed to the identifiable as-
sets, and the capitalization rate for the remainder, will be important determinants of
trademark value. Those values necessarily involve some educated guesswork about the
380 [Vol. 28:315
CONCURRENT USE OF TRADEMARKS
These authors take what may be a more conservative ap-
proach to trademark valuation than the Interbrand approach.
Indeed, they criticize the results reached in the financial mag-
azine purportedly using the Interbrand approach. 2 Their crit-
icisms may reflect a different philosophy about trademark utili-
zation and valuation, but they also highlight the fact that the
use of any technique necessarily will be imperfect. That, howev-
er, should not deter us from creating a mechanism to deal with
the proven problem of concurrent use.
Without endorsing any particular methodology, one can see
that there are ways to evaluate the worth of a trademark. Ob-
viously, the factors 'used by the different authors could vary
from case to case. The brand strength multiplier used by Inter-
brand, for example, would be difficult to measure for lesser
known brands. Moreover, the circumstance of the buyout, where
there are two lawful users of a single mark, may complicate
matters. However, there are ways to account for such problems.
Where a remote user is limited to a particular geographic area,
the evaluation can take that into account in determining
growth potential. If a registered user is buying out a remote,
and thus presently non-infringing, but non-good faith junior
user, the fact that the junior user's ability to use the mark can
be terminated by the senior user almost at will can be account-
ed for in the valuation. Naturally, exactness will be next to
impossible to achieve. On the other hand, we should remember
that there are many areas in which the legal system does not
demand anything approaching precision when computing com-
pensation. For example, in personal injury suits, lay jurors
(albeit aided by expert witnesses) are asked to evaluate the
worth of a life, a limb, a loss of consortium, of pain and suffer-
ing. In business contexts, juries may be required to estimate
lost profits from unfair trade practices such as theft of trade
secrets or from breaches of contract. Such computations seem
no more imprecise or "speculative" than the valuation of a
trademark. What is required is fairness, not complete precision.
The methodologies discussed above use concepts common to
other forms of business valuations.Y If their results are
future. See SMITH & PARR, supra note 252, at 281 & Table 9.7.
272. SMITH & PARR SUPP., supra note 252, at 31-42.
273. One situation in which business valuation and litigation intersect is a pro-
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rational, they should be viewed as fair. In that case, an arbi-
trated buyout process is a reasonable approach to the problem.
Because this is not an ordinary buy/sell situation, any valua-
tion methodology should account for certain factors specific to
the situation. For example, a small business may be lawfully
using a well known mark. Should the mark's sale value reflect
the fact that its purchase would permit better business
planning by the seller or should we only measure the value to
the selling business?274 Should we subtract from its selling
value income that may be attributable to consumer confusion
with the larger corporate owner of the well known mark?275
Consider another, more mundane, example. We noted earlier
that the valuation procedure may be used when the junior
user's right to use the mark is subject to immediate defeasance
by the senior user because the junior use postdated registra-
tion. The valuation should reflect the fact that the seller's right
to use the mark is dependent on the senior user's
sufferance.276 Should the value also reflect the customer iden-
tification with the junior user on which senior user may now
trade? Alternatively, should it reflect the difficulty faced by the
senior user attempting to break allegiances to the prior
user?277 I would submit that these latter values ought not be
considered. We are trying to compensate the seller for what has
been lost, not measure the value gained by the purchaserY
However, they are potential complications for the process.
It also is possible that, in many cases, the complex valuation
ceeding to appraise the value of the shares of a corporate shareholder who dissents
from certain major transactions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991). Such
a proceeding may use one of several kinds of business valuation techniques. Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (court may use "techniques or
methods generally considered acceptable in the financial community"); In re Valuation
of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 63-67 (Me. 1979).
274. The Interbrand approach might permit the former, while the Smith & Parr
approach seems to favor the latter.
275. Measuring this would not be an easy task.
276. See SMITH & PARR, supra note 251, at 315-16.
277. Cf Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365,
1375 (10th Cir. 1977) (allowing an award of advertising expenses to injured plaintiff
to overcome damage caused by a junior user who created reverse confusion among
tire customers as to the true owner of the mark).
278. Having said that, I recognize that the concept of "just compensation" could
include these values if they ordinarily are considered part of fair market value.
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processes described above would be overly time consuming con-
sidering the nature of the business involved. Where the "seller"
of the mark is a small business, the identifiable value of the
mark may be negligible. One may decide that a more appro-
priate measure in such cases is the actual cost to the seller of
changing its mark and purchasing new signs and new station-
ary, for example, together with some compensation for advertis-
ing needed to acquaint the public with the new mark."9 Per-
haps a new law should permit such measures to be used in
cases where the selling business is smaller than a certain size.
Again, however, it must be emphasized that the goal is some
sense of fairness, not absolute precision.
Another important facet of the process is a system for report-
ing the results and reasoning of the arbitrator-evaluator. As a
body of precedent and process is created, other evaluations can
use this accumulated wisdom to make better decisions. A stat-
ute authorizing trademark buyouts should mandate that the
arbitrators issue written decisions and that these decisions be
collected, and hopefully computerized, at a central location,
perhaps under the auspices of the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice. If possible, these reports should be available on the exist-
ing databases of legal research so that access will be wide-
spread. In the beginning, there no doubt will be difficult mo-
ments as the valuation process is developed. But once it is in
place, some reasonably accepted mechanisms for valuation
should evolve which will smooth the process by generating an
accepted standard." This will make for better business plan-
ning and, hopefully, less consumer confusion in the long run.
Thus, even if the methodology used is nothing like what has
been discussed here, and even if we perceive the results to be
rather imperfect, the process is still worth implementing. The
continuation of concurrent use exacts a cost on both the busi-
ness and consumer sides that outweighs the detriments of in-
exact measurement. In the end, it is not the specific method
that is important; it is the existence of some method.
279. Cf Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc., 561 F.2d at 1365 (awarding corrective advertising
damages to overcome reverse confusion).
280. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 676-82 (1979) (de-
scribing the process in which class action practice matured).
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VIi. CONCLUSION
The very old problem of concurrent use continues to bedevil
the efforts of legislators trying to ameliorate its effects. The
constructive notice provision of the original Lanham Act did not
eliminate the problem, and the newer constructive use provision
also will not eliminate it. As long as courts and legislators
insist on permitting prior users in any geographic area to re-
tain their "equitable" rights in the mark,"' and as long as
they insist that even registered users show a present likelihood
of confusion through actual use or reputation in a territory,
there will continue to be concurrent use problems and potential
consumer confusion.
The proposals made here also will not eliminate the problem.
However, they will move toward that goal in two key respects.
The Dawn Donut rule preventing registered users from enjoin-
ing geographically remote, post-registration users should be
overturned. That would give the constructive notice provision of
the Lanham Act its full effect.
Second, allowing court supervised buyouts of trademarks
should eliminate many of the most troubling instances of con-
current use. A registered user who deems it worthwhile to buy
out another user signals that it is worth the money to elimi-
nate possible consumer confusion and, perhaps, to allow better,
more widespread use of the mark. The clear trend of legislative
activity is toward eliminating concurrent use of trademarks.
These proposals are further steps along that same path. They
remind us that trademark law is not just a protectorate of
business; the law is also a consumer protection matter. Elimi-
nating concurrent use eliminates some potential confusion. That
seems worth the incremental decrease in protection for remote
users of marks.
281. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988).
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